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Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing
the Jury as Fault-Finder
Michael T Cahilt
Discussions of criminal punishment tend to focus on sentenc-
ing as the unique moment when punishment is affixed. Yet two
punishment decisions are made in the course of establishing a
criminal defendant's liability. The first occurs at conviction,
where the available punishments are narrowed to the range de-
fined by the conviction offense's statutory grade. The second oc-
curs at sentencing, when the sentencing body makes a more re-
fined decision and selects a punishment within that range.1
At present, the first punishment decision involves no explicit
judgment by the relevant decisionmaker-the jury, in a jury
trial-as to what constitutes a proper punishment, even in broad
terms. Instead, the jury makes a set of factual findings and votes
for a conviction on one or more offenses, without knowing the
offense grade or the punishment range attaching to that grade.2
I Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Dana Brakman Reiser, Ed
Cheng, Susan Herman, Heidi Kitrosser, the participants in the Legal Forum symposium,
and the participants in a Faculty Colloquium at Seton Hall School of Law for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to David Kim for providing
useful research assistance.
1 The precision of the sentencing decision varies by jurisdiction. The official sentence
imposed following conviction may be a determinate sentence (say, "five years"), or it may
be an indeterminate sentence (say, "five to ten years"). As the name implies, a determi-
nate sentence is fixed at the time of sentencing, with less room for later adjustment; the
offender will be required to serve all-or at least a mandated percentage-of the imposed
term. An indeterminate sentence, on the other hand, allows for a range of possible pun-
ishments, and where an offender's sentence ultimately falls along that range will depend
in part on later determinations by "back-end" decisionmakers, such as a parole board.
See, for example, Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy:
Lessons From the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 Harv J on Legis 281, 289 n 63 (2003)
("Most states employ a system of indeterminate sentencing, which means that a parole
board actually has the final say as to how long an incarcerated defendant will remain in
prison; the judge's durational decision establishes an upper and lower bound to the parole
board's discretion."). See also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 Harv L Rev 2463, 2468 n 12 (2004) (noting multiple usages of "determinate"
and "indeterminate" in current sentencing parlance).
2 For a discussion of, and citations supporting, the general rule that the jury is not
to be instructed as to the punishment consequences of returning a conviction, see Rachel
E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
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The "first cut" punishment level determined by the offense's
statutory grade is then imposed administratively, by operation of
law.
This Article argues that the body making the first punish-
ment decision at the conviction stage should not be blind to the
consequences of that decision, which is what currently occurs in
jury trials (though not, significantly, in bench trials3). The pro-
posal in this Article is based largely on institutional competence
and seeks to realign the roles of the judge and jury to maximize
their competencies as well as the jury's role as fault-finder. The
jury should play both a greater and more explicit role in assign-
ing punishment-not (or at least, not only) by taking on a greater
role with respect to the second sentencing decision, which is the
focus of most current attention, but by wielding more, and more
informed, power with respect to the punishment consequences of
the initial decision to convict. In short, I propose that criminal
juries should receive instructions that provide information not
only as to the elements of the offenses with which a defendant is
charged but also as to the offense grades and overall sentencing
ranges that correspond to each of those offenses. Then, once the
informed jury has chosen the offense grade and thus a broad
punishment range, the judge can employ her expertise to assign
a punishment within that range.
This proposal is distinct from two other discrete, though re-
lated, recent trends and developments in criminal law and schol-
arship. First, the recent literature has discussed,4 and sometimes
advocated,' jury sentencing. Though sympathetic to this litera-
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U Pa L Rev 33, 79-80 n 206 (2003); Milton Heumann and
Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing Jurors About Punishment in Manda-
tory Sentencing Cases, 20 Am Crim L Rev 343, 358-61 (1983).
3 See Part II-B.
4 See, for example, Nancy J. King and Rosevelt Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in
Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 Vand L Rev 885, 898-940 (2004) (reporting results of a
descriptive study of how jury sentencing operates in three states); Erik Lillquist, The
Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 NC L Rev 621, 653-
75, 705-11 (2004) (questioning jury-sentencing schemes based on psychological studies of
jury decisionmaking, and critiquing the Apprendi line of cases as likely to generate prac-
tices similar to jury sentencing).
s See, for example, Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 Duke L J
951, 956 (2003) (arguing that with some limitations, "[tihere are compelling historical,
constitutional, empirical, and policy reasons to believe that trial judges' sentencing dis-
cretion should not only be curbed, it should be eliminated entirely and transferred to
juries"); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va L Rev 311, 350
(2003) (advocating jury sentencing and asserting that "[b]ecause of their deliberative
capacity and democratic makeup, juries are better situated than other political institu-
tions to perform the sensitive tasks of deciding between contested sentencing goals and
applying the law with due regard for the individual circumstances of each offender");
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ture's desire to invigorate jury involvement in punishment deci-
sions, I am somewhat skeptical about the mechanism that the
jury-sentencing advocates propose for achieving that goal. For
reasons discussed later,6 I recommend that judges retain a sig-
nificant role in sentencing decisions.
The second development is the recent line of United States
Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to a jury trial, in-
cluding Apprendi. v New Jersey, Blakely v Washington,8 and
United States v Booker. The focus of these recent cases is on the
jury's role as mandated by the Constitution. These cases assure a
defendant both the right to have a jury, rather than another en-
tity, decide the facts that determine the maximum available pun-
ishment, as well as the correlate evidentiary right to have those
facts decided beyond a reasonable doubt.
Many seem to believe that the Supreme Court has gone too
far in defining the jury's constitutionally-mandated fact-finding
role.1° This Article, however, argues that the Court's right-to-
jury-trial opinions have not gone far enough-at least in terms of
advancing sound principle and policy, as opposed to matters of
constitutional doctrine. Specifically, the Court's decisions focus
almost exclusively on one jury function to the detriment of an-
Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Yme Has
Come (Again) 108 Yale L J 1775, 1777 (1999) (arguing that jury sentencing may be "a
more direct and more effective mechanism for expressing the recent populist and retribu-
tive trends in criminal punishment").
6 See Part III-B.
7 530 US 466 (2000).
8 124 S Ct 2531 (2004).
9 125 S Ct 738 (2005).
10 See, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federal-
ism as a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J Crim L & Criminol 1, 12 (2003) ("Apprendi is
wrong. As I have argued elsewhere, Apprendis abstract principle undervalues the bene-
fits of insulated, expert judicial sentencing. It disrupts procedures that worked well to
reduce bias and ensure equality in favor of untested jury sentencing. And by fragmenting
crimes, it gives prosecutors more power to manipulate indictments and plea bargain,
while hobbling judges' power to check prosecutors at the sentencing stage."); Frank 0.
Bowman, III, Function over Formalism: A Provisional Theory of the Constitutional Law
of Crime and Punishment, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 1, 1 (2004) ("Blakely is a bad decision from
the point of view of real lawyers, judges, legislators, and defendants who will have to
inhabit the oddly configured post-Blakely universe."); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train
Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of
Blakely v. Washington, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217, 219 (2004) ("Blakely has created a
ghastly mess, bringing the federal criminal justice system to a virtual halt and putting a
number of state systems in disarray."). But compare Jon Wool, Aggravated Sentencing:
Blakely v. Washington, Legal Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, 17 Fed Sent
Rptr 134, 142 (2004) ("Although many commentators have stated that Blakely extended
the Apprendi rule too far, perhaps the strongest legal argument against Blakelyis that it
appears not to go far enough.").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
other." In addition to its procedural role of weighing the evi-
dence, the jury has a substantive role of assigning moral blame
(and rightly so, in my view). Part of the jury's proper function-
though not necessarily its constitutionally required function 12-is
to figure out the meaning of the facts in terms of the relative
amount of punishment that they warrant. In other words, the
jury both is and should be not merely a finder of facts, but a
finder of fault.
The jury as fault-finder is one of two premises on which this
Article's proposal rests. The other is that there is no obvious or
compelling reason to draw a strict and categorical distinction
between the jury's voice as to the question of liability vel non and
its silence as to the question of how much liability is appropriate.
There may be sound reasons to give the jury different types or
levels of responsibility for each of these two questions, but if so,
the reasons should be articulated. A complete differentiation of
the roles of the jury with respect to these two issues seems arbi-
trary unless explicitly justified.
Perhaps neither premise of this Article sounds radical or
even especially controversial. Yet, taken together, they substan-
tially challenge current law, which grants the jury a fault-finding
capacity for assessing guilt while steadfastly denying the jury
any such capacity-even in the crudest, most basic terms-for
assessing punishment.
The jury should have enough information for its first-cut de-
termination about punishment to reflect an actual decision, not
an unknown consequence of some other deliberation. Our current
way of asking the jury to make various normative judgments in
the course of establishing liability vel non--when the jury has no
idea, even at the broadest level, about how those judgments
translate into actual punishment-does not make sense. Accord-
" For a similar (though not precisely congruent) criticism, see Barkow, 152 U Pa L
Rev at 44-46 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the Apprendi line of cases gives insufficient
attention to the jury's institutional role as a check on governmental power, and advocat-
ing an enhanced role for the jury in applying sentencing rules).
12 I make no claim that this article's proposal is of constitutional dimension-and I
tend to think the Supreme Court agrees with me on that score. See Shannon v United
States, 512 US 573, 587 (1994) (holding that the jury need not hear about the conse-
quences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity). Others, however, have made
somewhat similar arguments on constitutional grounds. Consider Heumann and Cassak,
20 Am Crim L Rev at 371-82 (cited in note 2) (arguing, on due process and equal protec-
tion grounds, that juries should be instructed about mandatory minimum sentences);
Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum L Rev 1232, 1260-71 (1995) (recommending that the
jury be instructed about mandatory minimum sentences, and suggesting, without quite
explicitly claiming, a Sixth Amendment basis for such a rule)..
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ingly, as noted above, this Article proposes that the jury, in its
capacity as assigner of blame, should be instructed as to the of-
fense grades and sentencing ranges that attach to the offenses
with which a defendant is charged."3
Part I of this Article first explains and defends the jury's
fault-finding role generally, then advocates the Article's central
proposal: the expansion of that role to include making the jury
explicitly aware of the punishment-determining aspect of the
conviction vote. Part II describes and considers the current role
and proper role of the judge with respect to decisions about an
offender's punishment, comparing the judge's function with that
of the jury. Part III briefly fleshes out, and explores the potential
consequences of, the Article's basic proposal in light of the earlier
discussion and with regard to other legal and practical consid-
erations.
I. THE JURY'S FAULT-FINDING ROLE
Asserting that the jury's function does, and should, include
normative as well as purely factual and evidentiary judgments is
hardly new or controversial. As this Part discusses, the basic jus-
tifications for having a right to a jury trial always have relied in
part on a sense that the jury is a proper and fair arbiter of a
criminal defendant's moral blameworthiness. Further, various
specific criminal-law rules have been designed to depend on jury
resolution of significant moral issues bearing on a defendant's
liability. Denying the jury any role in assessing normative issues
as to the amount of punishment, and allowing it to make only a
binary decision about whether to punish, prevents the jury from
13 Sherman Clark has made a similar proposal, though with very different justifica-
tions. See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Mich L Rev 2381, 2381-
84, 2442-45 (1999). Clark emphasizes the "expressive content" and "social meaning" of
jury decisions. Without denigrating these concerns, I am not relying on them here. My
interest generally is in the role of juries relative to other institutional players, rather
than considered in isolation and in the abstract, as is centrally Clark's approach.
More specifically, I discuss here the jury's institutional competence, especially
relative to that of a sentencing judge, and also how the allocation of punishment decisions
between judge and jury affects not only the relationship between those two players, but
between both of them and the legislature. See, for example, Parts I-C-I, II-C, III-B. I am
concerned with what role we should assign the jury as a matter of sensible policy, rather
than what that role "says" about them, or what it "says" about us as a society. Descrip-
tively, I note that juries currently make normative judgments, so there is nothing trans-
parently unusual or improper about asking them to make an explicit normative judgment
about punishment. See Part I-A. Normatively, I maintain that doing so would be a good
idea, not merely or even mainly for "expressive" reasons, but as a matter of their compe-
tence and as a check on other institutional forces. See Parts I-B to I-D, III-B.
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fulfilling its proper mission, and may even impede its ability to
accomplish the tasks currently assigned to it.
Section A of this Part provides support for the descriptive
claim that the jury's role, both historically and today, involves an
evaluative aspect as well as responsibility for determining the
existence of objective facts. Section B defends the normative
claim that this practice of entrusting the jury with some fault-
finding, as well as factfinding, authority is justifiable and, in-
deed, desirable.
At present, however, the jury's fault-finding role does not in-
clude any explicit responsibility for the punishment-related as-
pects of the conviction decision. In fact, no party now bears ex-
plicit responsibility for the punishment consequences of a convic-
tion vote in a specific case. Section C advocates filling the present
normative vacuum by allowing juries to make their verdict deci-
sions while possessing information about the potential punish-
ments that are at stake. Section D responds to possible criticism
of this proposal as condoning, and perhaps advocating or depend-
ing on, jury nullification.
A. Historical and Empirical Support
Throughout American history, the significance of the jury
has been defended on grounds related to the jury's role as a
moral arbiter, as opposed to a mere weigher of competing objec-
tive claims of fact. The jury's overt fault-finding authority has
changed, and in some ways diminished, over time, but, even to-
day, criminal juries remain invested with considerable normative
discretion. In various ways, their job demands not only determi-
nations about what an alleged offender did, but moral assess-
ments of whether the accused is sufficiently blameworthy to
merit criminal sanction.
1. Generally: Jury as conscience and counterweight.
The role of the jury, particularly the criminal jury, always
has been thought to transcend mere "utilitarian fact-finding."14
Various procedural rules make clear that the jury's function goes
beyond resolving evidentiary issues of fact. In using their discre-
tionary authority to exercise lenity, for example, criminal juries
may render factually inconsistent verdicts.15 The defendant also
14 Sauer, 95 Colum L Rev at 1249 (cited in note 12).
15 See, for example, Dunn v United States, 284 US 390, 393 (1932) ("Consistency in
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has the right to a general verdict; that is, the jury's role may not
be cabined into merely returning special findings of fact that
form the basis for the court's entry of conviction. 6 It is well set-
tled that the role of the criminal jury "is not merely to determine
the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ulti-
mate conclusion of guilt or innocence."' 7
This aspect of the jury's decision-making power was central
to the Founders' conception of the jury and their view of the jury,
and particularly the criminal jury,18 as fundamentally impor-
tant. 9 Case-by-case jury assessment of the wrongfulness of an
alleged offender's behavior would assure a popular voice in the
determination of punishment.2" As one convention delegate put it
at the time:
Let [a man] be considered as a criminal by the general
government, yet only his own fellow-citizens can convict
the verdict is not necessary."); United States vPowell, 469 US 57, 64-65 (1984) (reaffirm-
ing the "Dunn rule" allowing inconsistent jury verdicts).
One reason juries engage in this practice is that they seek, notwithstanding their
lack of clear information on the matter, to generate an amount of punishment for an
offender that seems fair and proportionate. See, for example, Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at
81-82 (cited in note 2) ("[T]he jury deliberately acquits on some charges and convicts on
others, even when such results are logically inconsistent, in order to reach a just outcome.
... The jury knows that its compromise position will result in a reduced sentence; it miti-
gates punishment precisely because it believes the defendant should not be blamed for
the entirety of the conduct with which she is charged."). Of course, given juries' ignorance
of the actual punishment consequences of their decisions, this effort to achieve justice
involves a great deal of conjecture and is subject to considerable inaccuracy.
16 See United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 513-14 (1995) (explaining that the jury's
general verdict allows it to decide mixed questions of law and fact); Sparf v United States,
156 US 51, 80-81 (1895) (discussing the jury's right to render a general verdict); Albert
W. Alschuler and Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U Chi L Rev 867, 912-13 (1994) ("[Nlineteenth-century disputants agreed that
... judges should not require juries to return 'special verdicts' in criminal cases [as that]
would have forced juries into too narrow a factfinding role[.]").
17 Gaudin, 515 US at 514. See also id at 513 (recognizing "the historical and constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt and
innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to the facts").
18 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 54-55 (cited in note 2) ("Even with an elected
government, there was agreement that the people should have another check on govern-
ment action in the criminal context, an area in which the government's power is at its
apex.").
19 See id (observing that the criminal jury's significance "was one of the rare subjects
on which both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed," and offering support for that
observation).
20 See id at 58 ("Even if the people's representatives agreed that certain behavior
should be criminalized, the Framing generation wanted the people themselves to have a
final say in each case. In criminal trials--trials that, at their core, are trials of the human
condition and morality-the jury would allow the morality of the community and its no-
tions of fundamental law to inform the interpretation of the facts and, in some cases, to
overcome the rigidity of a general criminal law.") (internal citation omitted).
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him; they are his jury, and if they pronounce him inno-
cent, not all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and in-
nocent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed
law he resisted was an act of usurpation.2
Like voting, and no less than voting, jury service was a critical
way for the jury to express its views on law and matters of public
interest and policy.22 Indeed, some saw the jury right as even
more critical than the franchise, as it would prevent government
from exercising tyrannical power over specific people in individ-
ual cases.23 In short, belief in, and protection of, the jury's fault-
finding role dates to the earliest days of the American republic.
In fact, the American criminal jury once had even more-or
at least, more explicit-power to decide moral or legal issues
than it now does. Early in the nation's history, it was common for
juries to decide legal as well as factual issues.24 The jury also had
a significant de facto, if not de jure, influence over punishment,
at least in the nation's early history.25 Because specific crimes
often led to particular defined punishments, rather than the
broad discretionary ranges that later became common, the jury
could, and often did, make decisions about conviction and acquit-
tal based on its assessment of the appropriate penalty.26
21 Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 58 n 119 (cited in note 2), citing Jonathan Elliot, ed,
The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelp ia, in 1787, at 94 (JB
Lippincott 2d ed 1891) (statement of Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts Conven-
tion of 1788).
22 See generally Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to
Voting, 80 Cornell L Rev 203 (1995).
23 See, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19,
1789), reprinted in Neil H. Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of'Rights 596 (Oxford 1997)
("Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative
or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative.");
Essays by a Farmer (IV), Md Gazette (Mar 21, 1788), reprinted in 5 Herbert J. Storing,
ed, The Complete Anti-Federalist 36, 38 (Chicago 1981) (referring to the jury as "the
democratic branch of the judiciary power-more necessary than representatives in the
legislature") (emphasis in original).
24 Numerous other commentators have described the history of the criminal jury
deciding issues of law, so I will not reiterate the details here. See, for example, Alschuler
and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 902-21 (cited in note 16); David C. Brody, Sparf and Dough-
erty Revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullilcation Right, 33 Am
Crim L Rev 89, 98-101 (1995); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Flnction of the
American Jury, 1999 Wis L Rev 377, 381-435; Lillquist, 82 NC L Rev at 640-50 (cited in
note 4).
25 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 101 (cited in note 2) (discussing the jury's unre-
viewable power to acquit as a check on excessive punishments in mandatory-punishment
scheme).
26 See Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625, 640 (1980) (noting that the right to acquit of
greater offense and convict of lesser included offense enabled juries to "create[] their own
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Over time, partly because of the rise of a trained profes-
sional class of lawyers and judges,27 the jury's explicit power to
decide issues categorized as "legal" eroded.2" Yet even though it is
no longer typical to give the jury formal power to resolve legal
issues, various legal and practical influences assure that the jury
retains considerable say over legal issues.29 In both civil and
criminal cases, the jury retains an interpretive function that in-
volves, at some level, a determination of what the law is or
means.3 ° Accordingly, to this day, a central aspect of the jury's
role is to decide issues that go beyond objective facts to include
moral assessments of an offender's blameworthiness.3'
sentencing discretion by distorting the fact-finding process"); Lillquist, 82 NC L Rev at
636-39 (cited in note 4) (discussing juries' use of lesser-offense convictions and "benefit of
clergy" as methods of reducing punishment via conviction decisions in eighteenth century
England and America). Compare Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Con-
science: Perspectives on the English Criminal rial Jury 1200-1800, at 28-64, 261 (Chi-
cago 1985) (discussing English juries' willingness to convict of lesser offenses because
they considered penalties for greater offenses too harsh); John H. Langbein, Shaping the
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Thai: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U Chi L Rev 1,
54-55 (1983) (pointing to cases where an English jury of the eighteenth century "not only
decided guilt, but it chose its sanction through its manipulation of the partial verdict").
27 See, for example, Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 917 (cited in note 16)
(suggesting the rise of trained professionals and published legal authorities as the possi-
ble cause for "displacement of jurors by judges in resolving legal issues"); Stephen C.
Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U Chi Legal F 87, 103-06
(describing the historical development of, and tension between, "lay and professional
justice").
Another significant factor in the changing historical role of the criminal jury re-
lated to changing understandings of the purposes of criminal law itself. See Part I-B-2.
28 See Sparf v United States, 156 US 51 (1895) (holding that juries do not have a
"right" to decide legal questions, though noting that they have the "power" to do so); Jef-
frey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 67-88 (Basic
1994) (discussing the reduction over time of juries' authority to decide questions of law).
29 See, for example, Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 914 (cited in note 16)
("[T]he primary significance of the disappearance of the jury's de jure power to resolve
issues of law may be symbolic. Undisputed procedures ... ensured both nineteenth- and
twentieth-century American juries the practical power to 'acquit against instructions'...
[and] frequently ensured the power to 'convict against instructions' as well."). See also
Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 67-68 (cited in note 2) (asserting that Sparf t rejection ofjury
"right" to decide legal questions, while recognizing its "power" to do so, reduced jury's law-
finding authority less than others have contended). Compare id at 48-49 ("Because the
Double Jeopardy Clause shields absolutely a jury's general verdict of acquittal from re-
view, the jury has necessarily been given the power to decide the law as well as the facts
in criminal cases.") (emphasis in original).
30 See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the NulIling Jury, 93 Nw U L Rev 877, 908-
16 (1999) (discussing the jury's historical, and ongoing, interpretive function); Yeazell,
1990 U Chi Legal F at 113-17 (cited in note 27) (discussing the jury's role in substantive
development of tort law).
31 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 68 (cited in note 2) ("[A]lthough th[e] erosion [of
the jury's normative power] is significant, it did not strip the jury of its core power to
check the state and reach an equitable result, even if it means nullifying the law in a
particular case. The criminal jury has retained its power to issue an unreviewable gen-
eral verdict of acquittal, thus protecting the jury's law-application function and reaffirm-
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2. Specific fault-finding aspects of the conviction decision.
Various aspects of the jury's general authority grant it the
power, and the obligation, to decide normative fault-related is-
sues. Of course, in every criminal case that a jury hears, the ba-
sic concept of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" involves a vague
evidentiary standard whose substantive content the jury sup-
plies on an ad hoc (and largely unreviewable) basis.3" Further,
the jury's protected role in applying law to the facts33 assures it a
norm-determining function, as applying the law to particular
cases "is a complex psychological process, one that often involves
judgment. The more general the rule, the larger the domain for
judgment. Thus, law application frequently entails some attempt
to elaborate the governing norm."34 Accordingly, the criminal
jury necessarily "possesses the power to elaborate the governing
norms underlying criminal laws from the perspective of the
community and its sense of moral blameworthiness."3 5
Moreover, this broad authority to make moral assessments
is directly instantiated in a number of particular doctrinal for-
mulations. For example, it is the norm, rather than the excep-
tion, for the jury to fill in broad and ambiguous culpability terms
with its own understanding of an individual defendant's blame-
worthiness. 31 Standard definitions of recklessness and negli-
gence, two of the four fundamental culpability levels in most
modern criminal codes, refer to a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that constitutes a "gross deviation" from what a "law-
abiding" or "reasonable" person would recognize and heed.37 All
of these terms, which call for normative assessments in order to
place specific behavior along a spectrum of possible risks and
ing that the criminal jury performs more than a factfinding role under the Constitution.").
32 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues
of Variability, 36 UC Davis L Rev 85, 146-76 (2002) (discussing, and offering normative
justification for, variation in content of the reasonable-doubt standard); Marder, 93 Nw U
L Rev at 910-11 (cited in note 30) (discussing the vagueness of the reasonable-doubt
standard); consider Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal
Cases: Some Doubt about Reasonable DoubA 78 Tex L Rev 105, 112-18, 119-31 (1999)
(discussing approaches to instructing the jury about the reasonable-doubt standard, and
their practical effects).
33 See note 17 and accompanying text.
34 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum L Rev 229, 236 (1985).
35 Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 59 (cited in note 2).
36 For a general discussion of the jury's special role in applying the law, see Darryl K.
Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury In-
terpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 Mich L Rev 1199, 1210-16 (1998).
37 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (as adopted in 1962) (ALI 1985) ("MPC") (defining
recklessness); id § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligence).
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levels of disregard or inattentiveness, are essentially undefined
in the law, leaving the jury to insert its own evaluations. Simi-
larly, typical formulations of the manslaughter mitigation call on
the jury to determine what counts as an "extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse."38 Again, the content of the notions of extremity and rea-
sonableness must be filled in by the jury. Further, all these stan-
dards-for recklessness, negligence, and manslaughter-invite
the jury to individualize its expectations of suitable behavior
based on what the jury deems relevant about "the actor's situa-
tion."
39
It might seem natural, if not inevitable, that the jury must
make individual normative evaluations of blameworthiness in
making a finding regarding culpability. But the jury's normative
role embraces not only issues related to the defendant's mental
state; often the jury also must impose moral judgments on objec-
tive behavior. Perhaps most significantly, the jury is entrusted
with making the fundamental decision regarding when conduct
crosses the line from non-criminal (as "mere preparation") to
criminal (as an attempt). All standard formulations of the con-
duct requirement for attempt-whether demanding a "substan-
tial step" toward the offense,4" or conduct that "tends to effect"
the crime,4' or conduct in "dangerous proximity" to the of-
fense42-- offer only vague and general descriptions that basically
ask the jury to make a difficult moral judgment in an individual
case: was this conduct serious enough to warrant punishment? 3
The basic standard for distinguishing criminal conduct from jus-
tified (and therefore non-criminal) conduct similarly calls on the
jury to evaluate whether "the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged.' 4
38 Id § 210.3(1)(b).
39 Id. See also id § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness); id § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negli-
gence).
40 Id § 5.01(1)(c).
41 NY Penal Law § 110.00 (McKinney 2004).
42 See People v Davis, 16 F3d 212, 218 (7th Cir 1994), quoting People v Terre]], 459
NE2d 1337, 1341 (111 App 1984).
43 Indeed, the standard attempt formulations are vague enough that juries tend to
decide cases in precisely the same fashion irrespective of the governing legal standard
that they are instructed to apply, despite the clearly different positions that the stan-
dards are meant to adopt. See note 92 and accompanying text.
44 MPC § 3.02(1)(a).
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These are just a handful of examples, and anyone with more
than a casual familiarity with criminal law could identify others.
The point is merely that the jury has, and is meant to have,45 a
significant normative role in applying-indeed, in effectively de-
fining-broad and ambiguous legal standards that otherwise
lack substantive content. This normative function is every bit as
significant as the jury's objective fact-finding role, both as a mat-
ter of principle and, perhaps, as a matter of practice. As one
judge has noted:
[I]n my experience, most criminal cases that go to trial
are not about factual guilt; they are about moral guilt.
That is, very few criminal cases really involve any color-
able dispute about whether the charged act was commit-
ted or even whether the defendant was the one who com-
mitted it. Instead, most involve difficult questions about
the level of a defendant's criminal culpability[.]46
45 For example, the Model Penal Code's widely followed formulation of the man-
slaughter mitigation explicitly was designed to allow for juries to flesh out its require-
ments in individual cases as they arose. See MPC § 210.3 Comment at 63 (1980) ("The
Model Code endorses a formulation that affords sufficient flexibility to differentiate in
particular cases between those special aspects of the actor's situation that should be
deemed material for purpose of grading and those that should be ignored. There thus will
be room for interpretation of the word 'situation,' and that is precisely the flexibility de-
sired. There will be opportunity for argument about the reasonableness of explanation or
excuse, and that too is a ground on which argument is required. In the end, the question
is whether the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympa-
thy in the ordinary citizen. Section 210.3 faces this issue squarely and leaves the ultimate
judgment to the ordinary citizen in the function of a juror assigned to resolve the specific
case.").
Similar explanations appear for the Code's flexible definitions of culpability terms
and the conduct requirement for attempt. See MPC § 2.02 Comment at 237 (1985) ("Some
standard is needed for determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must
be in order to warrant a finding of culpability. There is no way to state this value judg-
ment that does not beg the question in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must
evaluate the actor's conduct and determine whether it should be condemned. The Code
proposes, therefore, that this difficulty be accepted frankly, and that the jury be asked to
measure the substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk[.]"); id § 5.01 Comment at 329
(1985) ("Whether a particular act is a substantial step is obviously a matter of degree. To
this extent, the Code retains the element of imprecision found in most of the other ap-
proaches to the preparation-attempt problem."); id § 5.01 Comment at 332, 352 (noting
limitations on the judge's power to refuse to instruct the jury on issue of "substantial
step," or to set aside the jury's conviction).
The United States Supreme Court also has explicitly recognized the jury's critical
normative function in establishing that the jury must be allowed to decide such issues as
.materiality" for purposes of perjury, or more generally, to decide "mixed" questions of
law and fact. See Gaudin, 515 US at 513-14.
46 Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 991-92 (cited in note 5).
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The jury's fault-finding role, then, is not merely some minor af-
terthought or unavoidable corollary to its fact-finding role; it is a
central aspect of the jury, in its fundamental justification and its
day-to-day operation.
B. Normative Support
1. The function of the jury.
The previous section asserted that, as a descriptive matter,
part of the criminal jury's authority always has been, and con-
tinues to be, a role in making normative evaluations. This sec-
tion moves beyond the somewhat negatively expressed observa-
tion that the jury is not merely a factfinder to offer an affirma-
tive claim that serving this role is one of the jury's most powerful
and fundamental purposes. Not only as historical fact, but as
ongoing normative justification, the jury long has been held and
upheld to be the moral "conscience of the community."' v Jury sen-
tencing, where used, is also supported on this ground.'
The jury's normative, fault-finding function has been sup-
ported both on its own terms, based on the capacity of a lay jury
to express community norms, and also by reference to process-
related or instrumental concerns about balancing and legitimat-
ing institutional power. A significant part of the jury's ongoing
role and responsibility has been to protect against the otherwise
potentially overwhelming might exercised by state agents, in-
cluding police, prosecutors, judges, and, significantly, the legisla-
ture.49 The jury can check possible overreaching by the criminal
47 See Clark, 97 Mich L Rev at 2420-22 (cited in note 13) (discussing the historical
understanding of the jury as the community's conscience and providing supporting au-
thority).
48 See King and Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 895 (cited in note 4) (quoting an Arkansas
prosecutor as saying, "[Jury sentencing] is a wonderful mechanism of democracy. Having
a community-based barometer, I think it's appropriate."); id at 895 n 32 (offering quotes
from Kentucky and Virginia prosecutors, respectively: 'The community gets to reflect in
their sentences a sense of what the public thinks.'. . . 'Because the important thing is to
hear from the community, to hear what they have to say about a crime ... when they do
sentence, it is a better reflection of community judgment. People in the criminal justice
system for a long time frequently get inured to crime, they think, "Aw, it's just another
car broken into, give him a suspended sentence." But to the guy whose car was broken
into, it's a serious matter, to him and his neighbor, there may be a plague of these in their
neighborhood. To allow the jury to sentence gives the community a greater say.'").
49 See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 155 (1968) (concluding that the jury-trial
right was "granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Govern-
ment"); Singer v United States, 380 US 24, 31 (1965) (concluding that the jury-trial right
was "clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government"). See
also Taylor vLouisiana, 419 US 522, 530 (1975) ("the purpose of a jury is to guard against
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law itself as well as by legal agents.5" Requiring the conviction
vote of a lay jury ensures that "no one is likely to suffer of whose
conduct [the jury does] not morally disapprove; and this intro-
duces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by
the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions."5' Ensur-
ing a check against governmental abuse is especially important
in the criminal context, where the stakes are highest.5 2
Stated more affirmatively, jury authority promotes democ-
racy by giving the lay public a strong role in the legal system.
Importantly, jury service enables citizens to speak with a voice
different from the one they use in voting for political officehold-
ers. Juries make specific decisions about specific cases, which
differ markedly in content and in context from the general policy
inclinations voters can express (to the extent voters express any
clear preferences at all).53 The jury's role as moral conscience,
the exercise of arbitrary power"); Coigrove vBattin, 413 US 149, 157 (1973) ("the purpose
of the jury trial in criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression"); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1183-90 (1991) (discussing
the framers' intent for juries to curb overreaching by the judiciary and legislature);
Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 49 (cited in note 2) ("The jury is, by design, like the other
checks and balances in the government: 'further protection against arbitrary action.'")
(quoting Duncan, 391 US at 156); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution,
16 Cath Law 224, 231-36 (1970) (arguing that the jury, an inefficient factfinder, is justi-
fied only by its political function of preventing governmental oppression). Consider Sauer,
95 Colum L Rev at 1247-60 (cited in note 12) (discussing the role of the jury as a bulwark
against state oppression).
As to a concern with legislative overreaching specifically, see Federalist 48 (Madi-
son), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 309 (Mentor 1961) (warning of "dan-
ger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must
lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations"). Tying this concern
to the jury-trial right in particular, see Joseph Story, 3 Commentaies on the Constitution
of the United States § 1774 at 653 (Hilliard, Gray 1833) ("The great object of a trial by
jury in criminal cases is, to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. In-
deed, it is often more important to guard against the latter, than the former.").
50 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 38 (cited in note 2) ("Juries by design, with their
unreviewable power to acquit, can act as a check on overinclusive or overrigid criminal
laws. To be sure, this is an imperfect check, especially given the limited information the
jury now receives at trial.) (emphasis added).
r" Id at 36, quoting McCann v Adams, 126 F2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir 1942), revd on
other grounds, 317 US 269 (1942). See also Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 59 (cited in note 2)
("The purpose of the jury was to inject the common-sense views of the community into a
criminal proceeding to ensure that an individual would not lose her liberty if it would be
contrary to the community's sense of fundamental law and equity.").
52 See id at 61.
53 See id at 61-62 ("People view the law quite differently depending on whether they
are acting as jurors facing an individual defendant or as voters viewing the law in the
abstract. As voters, people consider the perceived overall threat of crime and tend to be
harsher than when they are presented with a concrete case. Jury trials force the people-
in the form of community representatives-to look at crime not as a general matter, the
way they do as voters, but instead to focus on the particular individual being charged.
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rather than mere objective factfinder, is also said to serve a use-
ful practical role in promoting broader societal acceptance of the
results of the justice system.54
To summarize, a strong sense of the criminal jury as an as-
sessor of moral blame, rather than merely a finder of objective
facts, long has been defended on both principled and practical
grounds.55 Yet the current legal scheme extends the jury's fault-
finding role only so far as the determination of issues relating to
the definition of an offense, and hesitates to inform juries about
the functional role they play in determining the punishment that
follows from a conviction for the offense.
This general restriction on the criminal jury's fault-finding
role is particularly anomalous given the roles juries are com-
monly asked to play in other contexts. As some commentators
have observed, it is especially curious that the present scheme so
strongly denies the criminal jury a voice in determining punish-
ment when civil juries-whose normative role is generally more
circumscribed and subject to more thorough review -are often
entrusted with the determination of compensatory, and even pu-
nitive, damages in civil cases.57 Although a full exploration of the
relative roles of the civil and criminal juries, either as a constitu-
The result is a more measured, individualistic evaluation of whether liberty deprivation
is appropriate. It is the essence of the judicial role-law application in an individual
case-performed by the people.").
54 See Marder, 93 Nw U L Rev at 918 (cited in note 30) ("[Jurors'] status as one-time
decisionmakers also makes it more likely that the verdict they reach will be accepted by
the rest of the citizenry."); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv L Rev 1357, 1368 (1985) ("Many of the proce-
dures of our legal system are best understood as ways to promote public acceptance of
verdicts."); Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 7 (Little, Brown 1966)
(stating that "because of popular participation, the jury makes tolerable the stringency of
certain decisions" and that "the jury is a guarantor of integrity"). Consider Gary Goodpas-
ter, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J Crim L & Criminol 118,
151 (1987) (explaining that criminal jury trial decisions "are culturally validated" and
represent "the community's moral assessment of that situation").
55 See Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 Yale L J 1355, 1375-
76 (1999) ("One of the primary functions of a jury is to express the moral sentiment of the
community in applying the law. In this regard, juries have better access to relevant in-
formation (such as current community views on punishment) than do sentencing judges.
Juries are also thought to be well-suited for decisions that are difficult to articulate
through general principles.").
56 See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va L Rev 253, 264-65
(1996) (contrasting rules protecting the criminal jury's authority with oversight and re-
versal mechanisms available for review of civil jury decisions).
57 See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 953 n 2 (cited in note 5) ("No state takes the decision
about compensatory damages away from juries in ordinary, common-law-based civil
cases. Only two states-Connecticut (in some kinds of cases) and Kansas-take the deci-
sion about exemplary damages away from juries.").
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tional" or a prudential59 matter, is beyond the scope of the pre-
sent Article, this odd dichotomy is at least worth noting.6"
Moreover, "[t]o further deepen the paradox,"61 criminal juries
do sometimes have an explicit role in punishment determina-
tions: namely, in cases involving the death penalty. Although
non-capital juries are not even informed about the possible pun-
ishment consequences of their decisions, juries in capital cases
have long been asked to determine, 62 and are now constitution-
ally required to determine,63 facts that will expose a defendant to
capital punishment. This combination of rules-that civil juries
generally decide damages, and capital juries rule on the death
penalty, while other criminal trial juries are not only prevented
from deciding punishment, but denied information about the
punishment implications of the decisions they already make-is,
to put it mildly, curious.6
58 See generally Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Sentencing Facts
After Booker: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 Ga L Rev 895
(2005). See id at 903-04 ("A discrepancy between the scope of the jury rights under the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments would not seem unusual if it resulted in a more expan-
sive right for criminal defendants. After all, criminal defendants enjoy added protections
from the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the possibility of jury nullification.
But in the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility, the Supreme Court's Sixth and
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence has . . . produced a system in which a civil litigant
may demand a jury decision on questions that, if presented in a criminal case, would fall
within the exclusive province of the judge."). Compare Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 974 (cited
in note 5) (noting that Supreme Court case law since the 1980s has drawn "bright lines
between the Sixth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment, between the jury's civil role
as awarder of compensatory damages and the judge's criminal role as sentencer," but
criticizing this trend and claiming that later cases have also called it into doubt).
59 See, for example, Kirgis, 39 Ga L Rev at 904 (cited in note 58) ("There is simply no
good reason to ensure that civil litigants get a jury decision on all questions of fact rele-
vant to the imposition of a civil award while denying similar protection to criminal defen-
dants facing imprisonment or even death.").
60 For more thorough discussion, see id at 938-42 (comparing the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment case law regarding sentencing with its Seventh Amendment case law
regarding civil damages); id at 942-46 (defending jury decision-making authority on
policy grounds).
61 Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 954 (cited in note 5).
62 Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v Azizona, 536 US 584 (2002),
which applied the Apprendi principle to require jury findings for aggravating factors
authorizing capital punishment, most of the states allowing the death penalty gave juries
the power to decide when to impose it. See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 954 n 4 (cited in note
5) (summarizing states' pre-Ring treatment ofjury role in death penalty).
63 Ring, 536 US at 609. See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 980 (cited in note 5) (discussing
Ringholding).
64 See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 954 ("Apparently, jurors are necessary and trustwor-
thy only at the two ends of the 'importance' continuum-in civil cases where only money
is at stake and in capital cases where a life is at stake. They are somehow unnecessary or
untrustworthy in the vast middle.")
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2. The function of criminal punishment.
Our understanding of the jury's role in the determination of
criminal punishment also may change along with changing un-
derstandings of the purpose of criminal punishment itself. One
possible reason for the diminution in the jury's explicit fault-
finding function during the twentieth century is that criminal
law's connection to moral fault as a general matter was increas-
ingly being questioned, or rejected outright. For most of the
twentieth century, through about the 1960s, utilitarian models of
criminal justice, rooted in rehabilitation of offenders and deter-
rence of crime through manipulation of punishment severity lev-
els, were ascendant.65 These models relied on the professional
(and putatively scientific) expertise of institutional players such
as judges and, especially, parole boards to determine which of-
fenders have been rehabilitated. The system accordingly came to
put less stock in the opinion of juries-and, indeed, all "front-
end" decisionmakers who knew only about an offender's criminal
behavior and not about how he or she responded to rehabilitative
efforts-when it came time to decide how much punishment an
individual offender would receive.66
Today the utilitarian agenda largely has fallen out of favor,
both descriptively (in terms of how the system of criminal pun-
ishment is constructed and justified) and theoretically as a basis
for criminal punishment," in part because of a sense that reha-
bilitative efforts simply failed to achieve their goal.6" Instead,
retributivist (desert-based) justifications have come to the fore-
front, both in the world of policy and in the academy.69 As re-
65 See, for example, id at 997 ("By the end of World War I, [the rehabilitationist]
perspective was becoming dominant in American penology, and it remained dominant
until after World War II.).
66 See Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 326 (cited in note 5).
67 See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 997 and n 169 (cited in note 5) ("With a rapidity
rarely seen in complex social institutions, the rehabilitative ideal came crumbling down
just forty years after its ascension.") (citing, as the "preeminent obituary of rehabilita-
tion," Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal.- Penal Policy and Social
Purpose (Yale 1981)).
68 See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 997-98 (cited in note 5) ("[T]he real death knell for
rehabilitation was empirical: it just did not work. Crime was mysteriously immune to the
entire progressive regimen. Four decades worth of data rather dramatically showed that
all the idealistic efforts of this movement had virtually no effect on the propensity of
people to commit crimes."). For the classic contemporary account of the failures of the
rehabilitative ideal, see Robert Martinson, What Works: Questions and Answers About
Prison Reformn, 35 Pub Int 22 (1974).
69 See, for example, Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
Just"Punislumen4 96 Nw U L Rev 843, 845-47 nn 2-12 (2002) (offering numerous cita-
tions regarding the rise of retributivism as a justification for punishment, in scholarship
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tributivist concerns become more prominent in defining and jus-
tifying criminal law, it makes sense to reconsider the role of the
jury, which many think has a comparative advantage over other
systemic players in making moral judgments reflecting the com-
munity's level of moral disapproval of a given offense or of-
fender.7" The centrality of jury decisionmaking in capital cases,
for example, has been defended on the ground that the decision
to impose the death penalty rests on considerations of an of-
fender's moral desert."'
C. Punishment Judgments at Conviction: Filling the Normative
Vacuum
The jury's traditional role in assigning punishment is lim-
ited to establishing the grade of the offense. Even there, how-
ever, the jury does not know the consequences of its conviction
vote regarding the conviction offense's grade or sentence range.
In other words, as to the punishment ramifications of its deci-
sion, the jury's role is purely to find the underlying facts and not
to take an active part in assessing the relative gravity or moral
blameworthiness of the offense.
This current legal scheme creates a normative vacuum-
though only in jury trials, not in bench trials, as I discuss in Part
II-B-at the initial punishment-determinative stage of assigning
and in the law, since the 1970s). See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of
Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about
the Next, 70 U Chi L Rev 1, 1 (2003) (discussing the "demise of rehabilitation and emer-
gence of a 'new penology' in the century's final quarter"); id at 15-22 (advocating retribu-
tivism as the orientation for the punishment system); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications:
Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 20 Crime & Just: Rev Rsrch 1, 9-45
(1996) (describing the resurgence of retributivism starting in 1970s, and noting argu-
ments in its favor and against consequentialism).
As to the role of retributivism in assigning an amount of punishment, as opposed
to justifying the imposition of punishment generally, see, for example, Andrew Ashworth,
Sentencing and Criminal Justice 72-74 (Butterworth 3d ed 2000) (describing the "desert
theory" as "a modern form of retributive philosophy" and asserting that "the main thrust
and chief contribution of desert theory is to the quantum of punishment"); Andrew Von
Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions 6-19 (Oxford 1993) (describing "[t]he principle of propor-
tionality-that sanctions be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the offences");
Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice. The Choice of Punishments 67-76 (Hill & Wang 1976)
(describing how the "[sleverity of punishment should be commensurate with the serious-
ness of the wrong").
70 See, for example, Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 998-99 (cited in note 5); Lanni, 108
Yale L J at 1779 (cited in note 5).
71 See Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer concurring) (supporting jury
sentencing in capital cases based on the "belief that retribution provides the main justifi-
cation for capital punishment" and "the jury's comparative advantage in determining, in a
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end").
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a broad grade to the offender's conduct. The jury has a de facto
role in deciding an offender's punishment, in that its conviction
vote enables imposition of only the range of punishments speci-
fied for the relevant offense(s). The jury exercises that role, how-
ever, literally without knowing what it is doing.
This rule seems rooted more in history than in any princi-
pled basis. As noted earlier in Part I-B, the system already calls
on the jury to make significant normative-and, in a meaningful
way, legal-judgments when deciding whether to convict, so
overt recognition of its punishment-related authority is hardly
out of step with the jury's normal province. Denying information
about punishment consequences is based mainly in a traditional
notion that imposing punishment is the judge's and not the jury's
bailiwick." Yet discussions of this distinction offer little by way
of any general theoretical basis for giving the judge a monopoly
on punishment decisions.
In any event, the conviction decision is a punishment deci-
sion, with effects that the sentencing judge cannot revisit or re-
verse. The court's sentencing discretion is necessarily confined to
the statutorily authorized range of punishments.73 If refusing to
give the jury information about punishment consequences pro-
tects the power of any institution, therefore, it is not the judici-
ary but the legislature, whose general offense grading decision
applies mechanically, without specific review or approval as to
its application to any case.
1. Implementing (and checking) legislative determinations.
Some might support the current scheme, which keeps the
jury ignorant of punishment consequences, as a positive one, in
that it ensures that the jury will not overturn the legislative de-
termination of an offense's seriousness. But such a view runs
72 See, for example, Shannon, 512 US at 579 ("The principle that juries are not to
consider the consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in
our legal system between judge and jury. The jury's function is to find the facts and to
decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by
contrast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict.
Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is therefore irrelevant to the jury's
task.").
73 See, for example, Apprend, 530 US at 481 ("[O]ur periodic recognition of judges'
broad discretion in sentencing ... has been regularly accompanied by the qualification
that that discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by the legis-
lature."); Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 247 (1949) (noting that, in contrast to the
guilt stage of trial, the judge's task in sentencing is to determine, "within fixed statutory
or constitutional limits[,] ... the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt"
has been resolved).
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contrary to one of the central functions of the jury: its role in
curbing governmental overreaching.74 Far from promoting the
jury's capacity to act as a check on governmental abuse of power,
the current rules undermine that function and render the jury an
unwitting pawn of the legislature. When deciding whether to
convict of an offense, the jury can decide only whether the legis-
lature overreached in criminalizing the relevant conduct at all.
But the jury has no power to assess whether the government
acted too harshly in punishing the conduct so severely. Surely it
would be a rare case for the legislature to criminalize wholly in-
nocent activity undeserving of any sanction. It is unfortunately
all too common, though, for the legislature to mandate a pun-
ishment level that, if known, might strike a reasonable jury as
too severe.75 Empowering the jury to assess the propriety of the
chosen grade, rather than merely the propriety of having a given
offense vel non, is the only way for the jury to fulfill the govern-
mental-oversight aspect of its mission.76
Further, denying the jury the capacity to make a particular-
ized assessment of whether a prescribed offense grade should
apply to a given case means that nobody ever makes such an as-
sessment.77 The legislature's ex ante and categorical (however
broad) judgment about the relative seriousness of an offense is
never subject to question or adjustment when applied to specific
circumstances." Instead, the offense grade, and any additional
restrictions such as a mandatory minimum sentence, are auto-
matically applied whenever the jury finds that the offense's ele-
ments are satisfied and returns a conviction. There is, conse-
quently, no opportunity for any party to review whether the as-
signed grade makes sense, either generally or in the case at
74 See notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
75 For examples of situations where juries refused to convict because legislatively-
imposed punishments were considered too high, see notes 109, 122-23.
76 See, for example, United States v Datcher, 830 F Supp 411, 416 (M D Tenn 1993),
citing Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist Papers 562-64
(Wesleyan 1961) ("Institution of the jury system was meant to protect against unjust
punishment perpetrated by government, not merely unjust conviction.").
77 Compare David Garland, The Culture of Control 172 (Chicago 2001) (noting that
under guidelines-based and mandatory-minimum schemes, "legislatures and government
ministers have acquired more direct and unimpeded means of shaping practical out-
comes").
78 Compare Sauer, 95 Colum L Rev at 1263-64 (cited in note 12) ("When a mandatory
penalty is at stake, the legislature essentially has determined the penalty in advance,
thereby limiting the judge's role in determining the sentence .... Under these conditions,
if the defendant is to receive meaningful individual consideration with respect to pun-
ishment, it must come from the jury.").
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hand.79 Moreover, the only other screening device that might ap-
ply here-a general or as-applied challenge to the offense grade
under the Eighth Amendment-is nonexistent as a practical
matter."0
Perhaps none of that would matter if legislatures could be
relied on to categorize offenses thoughtfully and consistently, so
that the chosen offense grade truly captured some sense of the
relative seriousness of an offense. But even the best, most careful
legislature would have a difficult time making categorical ex
ante decisions about offense grading that perfectly capture the
relative seriousness of an offense in all its incarnations. "Even
when legislators mandate a clear direction, they cannot calibrate
statutes to cover every distinct factual situation,"8 ' nor would we
want them to try, for "problems that call for individualized, case-
by-case assessment are often better decided through small-scale
deliberation than through the mechanical application of a gen-
eral policy." 2 Legislation of general application is inevitably
overinclusive to some degree. 3
Further, the creation of rules and the subsequent application
of those rules are two different processes, each of which should
involve some conscious decisionmaker, rather than having the
legislature generate rules that are applied automatically, as is
currently done. Overall policy decisions are not the same as deci-
sions about implementation, and a democratic process for mak-
7 See Garland, The Culture of Control at 179 (cited in note 77) ("These methods of
fixing sentences well in advance of the instant case extend the distance between the effec-
tive sentencer (in reality, the legislature, or the sentencing commission) and the person
upon whom the sentence is imposed. The individualization of sentencing gives way to a
kind of 'punishment-at-a-distance' where penalty levels are set, often irreversibly, by
political actors operating in political contexts far removed from the circumstances of the
case. The greater this distance, the less likely it is that the peculiar facts of the case and
the individual characteristics of the offender will shape the outcome.").
80 Modern United States Supreme Court case law essentially eviscerates any poten-
tial to challenge any authorized punishment as disproportionate. See, for example,
Lockyer vAndrade, 538 US 63, 66, 77 (2003) (rejecting challenge to sentence, under Cali-
fornia's "three-strikes" law, of two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for theft
of about $150 worth of videotapes); Ewing v California, 538 US 11, 30-31 (2003) (affirm-
ing a sentence, under California's "three-strikes" law, of twenty-five years to life for theft
of three golf clubs with a total value of about $1,200); Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957,
996 (1991) (affirming a mandatory life sentence without parole for a first-time offender
convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine).
81 Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 350 (cited in note 5).
82 Id at 339-40.
83 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 61 (cited in note 2) ("Legislatures cannot predict ex
ante all the situations that will be covered by a general law; therefore, the law inevitably
will be overbroad and cover some situations that legislators (and those voting for them)
would not want covered. This is especially true given the dynamics of crime and punish-
ment in the political process.").
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ing policy decisions does not assure case-specific applications
that the majority would endorse.' Popular will, where it exists
at all, is not fixed, but subject to change with context or addi-
tional information."5 Even a perfect legislative process, then, is
no guarantor of sound outcomes in individual cases.
Further, as Paul Robinson and I have discussed elsewhere,
existing legislative processes are far from perfect; instead, politi-
cal forces exert a powerful, uni-directional pressure on legisla-
tures to expand criminal definitions and increase criminal penal-
ties. 6 Institutional dynamics are such that, from the legislature's
point of view, "too little criminalization tends to be riskier than
too much." 7 Offense definitions sweep too broadly, and penalties
reach too high, because legislators expect prosecutors to weed out
the excesses via non-prosecution or plea-bargaining downward-
or expect that the prosecutors, rather than the legislators, will
take the blame for any failure to do so.8"
The current contours of the jury right offer the potential for
the jury to protect against overbroad offense definitions, yet ut-
terly fail to provide any similar protection from overly high of-
fense penalties, as those penalties are fully insulated from any
jury scrutiny. Indeed, because the punishment consequences of
the jury's conviction vote are both unknown and binding in their
constraint on the judge's later sentencing choices, the current
scheme insulates penalties from any scrutiny at all, at least if
those penalties are formulated as offense grading decisions or
84 Consider Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 351 (cited in note 5) ("The 'majority will' ex-
pressed through the aggregation of votes and through public opinion is often very differ-
ent from the decision that citizens would make when given the opportunity to consider an
individual case and to deliberate about it."); Lanni, 108 Yale L J at 1781 (cited in note 5)
("When asked about sentencing in the abstract, citizens report a desire for harsher penal-
ties, but when presented with detailed descriptions of cases, these same citizens often
suggest more lenient penalties than those meted out by judges and, in many cases, than
the mandatory minimum sanctions currently in force in their jurisdictions.").
85 See Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries:
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 Hastings L J
1255, 1280 (1996) (noting that popular "preferences are often fluid and relative, contin-
gent upon possible and likely alternatives, or upon information and discussion"), quoted
in Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 351 (cited in note 5).
86 See Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 Hastings L J 633 (2005); Paul H. Robinson and Michael T.
Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves 1 Ohio St J
Crim L 169, 173-75 (2003) (describing the political pressures on each of the "players in
the criminal justice process").
87 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505,
549 (2001).
88 See id at 549-50 (detailing the agency costs associated with legislatures creating
criminal laws that they depend upon others to enforce).
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mandatory sentences, rather than as sentencing factors subject
to aggravation or mitigation.
2. Aiding fulfillment of current duties.
The jury's ability to fulfill its current fault-finding role is
handicapped when the jury makes conviction decisions while ig-
norant of the punishment consequences of those decisions, since
information about punishment ranges helps jurors assign mean-
ing to otherwise broad and ambiguous legal notions, such as cul-
pability terms. A jury deciding, for example, whether to convict
of murder or manslaughter-deciding, perhaps, whether a de-
fendant's emotional disturbance should be regarded as suffi-
ciently "extreme," and its basis sufficiently "reasonable," to merit
the mitigation89-might have a very different sense of how to re-
solve that legal issue if it knew how great a punishment dispar-
ity were riding on it. The larger the disparity, the less inclined
the jury might be to offer a mitigation from murder to man-
slaughter in less unusual cases, as it would likely be reluctant to
give a large punishment "discount" unless the offender could
show truly extraordinary circumstances warranting such a sig-
nificant departure from the punishment otherwise thought ap-
propriate. A relatively slight reduction in punishment, however,
might lead the jury to see the mitigation as less demanding. One
might say that this is entirely appropriate as a matter of imple-
menting the rule, as the magnitude of the punishment differen-
tial might reasonably serve as a proxy for the magnitude of the
moral or practical distinction thought to exist between the of-
fenses, thereby affecting the magnitude of the showing necessary
to persuade the jury that a mitigation is suitable. A jury simi-
larly might read the conduct requirement for attempt to be more
demanding as the corresponding punishment were to rise, or
grow closer to the punishment for the completed offense.9"
Informing the jury of the punishment consequences of its de-
cision to convict in the first place seems a sensible way for the
jury to make the requisite normative and legal assessments.
Providing information about punishment ranges serves as an
additional tool of statutory interpretation for the jury, in that the
89 See, for example, MPC § 210.3(1)(b); NY Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a).
90 The causation rule also might be read more strictly as the disparity were to in-
crease between liability for attempt and the completed offense. That is, with a more se-
vere punishment contingent on the issue of whether the defendant was the legal "cause"
of a result, the jury might demand a closer causal connection to support such a finding.
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associated ranges might provide a signal to the jury about what
otherwise ambiguous terms really mean." The jury's capacity for
normative and legal assessment is hindered, if not altogether
uprooted, without an understanding of how the legal rule or dis-
tinction in question bears on an offender's ultimate liability.
Some might say that the above characterization of how ju-
ries make decisions rests on the unrealistic assumption that ju-
ries take seriously their charge to apply the law, as it is given
them, to the facts of a case. These cynics might say that juries
aren't really trying to interpret, or even construct, the meaning
of "extreme emotional disturbance" or other such terms; juries
simply make an ad hoc decision as to what offense seems about
right, based on their gut feelings about the case and the defen-
dant. Perhaps this is true. There certainly is evidence to support
the claim that juries do not truly apply, or understand, legal in-
structions, and that they tend to employ their own pre-existing
moral and legal intuitions regardless of whether those intuitions
comport with the law."
But if that is true, then what does it mean? Essentially it
means that juries are, or may be, reaching verdict decisions that
contravene legislative definitions of crimes and defenses; in other
words, they may be engaging in what amounts to nullification of
the law on the books, but doing so unwittingly rather than by
making a conscious decision to override the legislative will. If
jurors do ignore the law in favor of their own sensibilities, they
are presumably making verdict decisions based on their best
guess as to the punishments that might attach to a particular
choice, and an assessment of which of those speculative options
comes closest to their own preferred outcome.
In that case, how would giving the jury information about
punishment ranges make matters any worse? It appears that
offering such information merely would enable the jury to more
easily, and accurately, do what it already does-that is, match
the resulting punishment range to its own sense of what seems
fair, regardless of what the law says. If so, at least such a system
91 I am indebted to Ed Cheng for this characterization of the point.
92 See, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs Criminal Law Doc-
trine: A False Dichotomy, 28 Hofstra L Rev 793, 796 (2000) (describing studies indicat-
ing that jurors' views "are unaffected by the definitions contained in the instructions that
courts give them" as to such issues as the definition of criminal offenses and defenses);
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mtiga-
tion? 1995 Utah L Rev 1, 10-11 and nn 46-49 (citing studies by "linguists, psychologists
and other academics [that] have shown that jurors tend to have great difficulty under-
standing the instructions that are supposed to guide their decision-making").
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would facilitate result-oriented verdicts that result in what the
jury wants, as opposed to the current scheme of result-oriented
verdicts that might be wildly inaccurate as to achieving the
sought-after result.
On the other hand, some studies suggest that jurors take se-
riously the task of interpreting their instructions carefully and in
good faith.93 If so, then this Article's proposal is just as appropri-
ate. To the extent there are concerns as to juries' misusing in-
formation about punishment ranges, it should be possible to as-
suage such concerns by providing additional instructions to the
jury regarding the proper use of the punishment-related infor-
mation that it receives. For example, if there are fears that the
jury will disregard the stated elements of the crime in order to
achieve a punishment range that it deems just-even if that
range attaches to an offense that the jury does not believe the
defendant committed-then the court can remind the jury that,
irrespective of its own views as to an appropriate sentence, it
must not return a conviction for any offense unless it is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved all
elements of that offense.
Information about possible punishment ranges also might
help the jury make sense of the reasonable-doubt standard itself
(or prevent the law from exploiting the vagueness of that stan-
dard to make conviction easier). Erik Lillquist has argued that
information about the seriousness of an offense might, in some
cases, affect jurors' attitudes regarding how much proof is neces-
sary to satisfy the undefined standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.94 In the typical case, where the actual punishment
does not depart greatly from what the jury otherwise might have
expected, this effect will be modest or perhaps even nonexis-
tent.95 Yet "when information about sentencing dramatically and
disproportionately changes jurors' feeling about one particular
type of outcome"-for example, where an offense carries a high
mandatory minimum sentence, increasing the perceived costs of
a wrongful conviction-providing the jury with that information
might lead them to demand clearer proof so that the risk of harm
93 See Shari Seidman Diamond and Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by
Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 Judicature 224, 225 (1996) (noting that jurors
"spend substantial time and effort attempting to apply instructions").
94 See R. Erik Lillquist, Expected Utility Theory and Variability in Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
9r See id at 12 ("In the typical criminal case involving moderately serious crimes, I
believe that information about the penalty has little effect on the standard of proof").
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from an inaccurate conviction vote is reduced.96 Thus for many
offenses, such as drug offenses, where mandatory minimums are
becoming increasingly routine,97 "ignorance may be artificially
lowering the standard of proof for the government."9" Without
expressing a view as to the normative desirability of juries' vary-
ing the demands of the reasonable-doubt standard from case to
case-a position Lillquist defends elsewhere 99-if the claim that
jurors do so is descriptively true, it is troubling to think that leg-
islatures and prosecutors could manipulate this tendency by cre-
ating and charging offenses that both artificially reduce the proof
necessary for conviction and remove any post-conviction sentenc-
ing discretion to set an offender's punishment below the floor set
by a mandatory minimum.
D. The Nullification Concern
One potential criticism of giving juries information about
possible punishments is that it might invite jury nullification.
Without wandering too far into the thicket of the general debate
about whether nullification is justifiable or desirable, which has
spawned a significant literature of its own, 00 I offer four re-
sponses to this concern as it arises in the context of this Article's
proposal.
First, it is worth mentioning that the proposal does not en-
dorse, or depend on, nullification to any greater extent than does
the general right to a jury trial, as currently defined. Of course,
"nullification" is itself a normatively loaded term that presup-
poses the propriety of a constrained role for the jury.1"1 If one
96 Id at 12-13.
97 See id at 13, citing Michael Tonry, SentencingMatters 79 (Oxford 1995).
98 Lillquist, Expected Utility Theory at 13 (cited in note 94).
99 See Lillquist, 36 UC Davis L Rev at 146-76 (cited in note 32) (arguing that "a
flexible reasonable doubt standard is preferable to a standard that would require a single,
fixed level of certainty").
100 See, for example, Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification: The Evolution of a Doctrine
(Carolina Academic 1998); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor and Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at
Work?A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juies, 78 Chi
Kent L Rev 1249, 1250 n 3 (2003) (collecting citations to books, book chapters, and arti-
cles on nullification); Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at 296-311 (cited in note 56) (reviewing argu-
ments on both sides and ultimately arguing against nullification).
1o1 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J Gender Race & Just
337, 370 (2002) ("The language used to describe the jury's ... role contributes to whether
the role is seen as legitimate or overreaching. If the jury is described as simply a fact-
finder and [its normative role of checking other institutions' overreaching] is described as
,nullification,' in which the jury is flouting or disregarding the law, then it is not surpris-
ing that this is seen as a departure from the jury's proper role...").
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objects to the specter of nullification in the context of the present
proposal, one presumably also objects to various aspects of the
criminal jury's current authority in making conviction decisions,
and would favor reforms such as allowing or mandating special
verdicts, enabling judicial review of acquittals, and so on."°2 The
present proposal merely argues that the criminal jury's current
power to decide issues (including normative and, as a practical
matter, legal issues) related to the definition of the crime should
exist in equal measure with respect to issues related to the
weight of the crime, at least in a very broad sense. There seems
to be no compelling reason in the abstract why juries should have
considerable discretion as to the first set of issues but zero dis-
cretion as to the second." 3 In fact, failure to include the second
set of issues within the ambit of jury authority allows for, and
even invites, the kind of legislative and executive abuses the jury
is meant to curb.10
4
Moreover, as Darryl Brown has argued, the jury's authority
to decide such issues need not be seen as a promotion or reflec-
tion of lawlessness, but is fully compatible with and can help
strengthen the rule of law.' The present proposal might better
be seen as offering a tool that acknowledges, and hopefully im-
proves, the current process of dynamic statutory interpretation
juries (as well as judges) already employ in their effort to harmo-
nize legal generalities with their specific moral intuitions in par-
ticular cases."0 6
Second, to the extent this Article's proposal grants nullifica-
tion power to the jury, it actually merely equalizes the jury's cur-
rent power vis-A-vis other players in the criminal justice system.
For example, in a bench trial, judges are armed with the pun-
ishment information that juries currently lack.'0 7 Failure to pro-
102 See notes 29-31 (discussing aspects of criminal jury's current unreviewable au-
thority to make normative decisions).
103 Compare Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 106-07 (cited in note 2) ("Because the threat
of overinclusive laws is the same in the case of al general laws of blameworthiness that
mandate criminal punishment-whether sentencing laws or liability laws-the response
should also be the same: a check by the people, operating in the judiciary, to provide an
equitable check against executive and legislative overreaching. It is insufficient to give
the jury authority over only a subset of those laws.") (emphasis in original).
104 See Part I-C-1.
105 See generally Darryl K Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81
Minn L Rev 1149 (1997).
106 Compare id at 1167-68 (discussing how both judges and juries must negotiate
between formal legal materials and external norms and conventions to develop coherent
"rule of law").
107 See Part II-B.
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vide this equalization creates an odd dichotomy between jury
trials and bench trials, possibly establishing a perverse incentive
for defendants to avoid a jury trial. Of course, some current ju-
rors may have knowledge from outside sources regarding sen-
tencing rules, and already may engage in nullification on that
basis.108 But the spottiness of such awareness, and the inconsis-
tent results generated by juries' disparate knowledge, merely
reinforce the need to provide such information uniformly.' 9
More broadly, it is routine for other institutional players,
such as judges and even (perhaps especially) prosecutors, to use
their knowledge of statutory punishments as a basis for making
authoritative decisions-about whom to prosecute, what to
charge, and how to sentence-that have the effect (and often the
intent) of shielding defendants from those punishments. Some-
how, the system tolerates such decisions without questioning
them or, indeed, even really noticing them. Why, then, is there so
much fear and trembling about the prospect of juries doing the
same thing? As Nancy Marder puts it:
Interestingly, when officials, such as police or prosecutors,
choose not to pursue a case, that decision is described as
within their "discretion." When state court judges decide
to give a lesser sentence, that decision is also described as
within their "discretion." However, when juries choose to
acquit because of dissatisfaction with the law or its appli-
cation, they are described as "nullifying," and this act is
viewed as leading inexorably to "anarchy" and "chaos." It
is difficult to account for the different ways in which these
acts of discretion are viewed."0
Juries are at least equally entitled to exercise this kind of discre-
tion, given the significance of their institutional role.
108 See, for example, notes 122-23.
109 See Poceedings of the Fiay-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, Panel Discussion-Jury Nullication, 145 FRD 149, 191 (June 10-12, 1992)
(quoting a juror who served on a hung jury where four jurors who knew "exactly what the
sentencing guidelines called for" refused to convict, believing that the sentence was too
harsh); Heumann and Cassak, 20 Am Crim L Rev at 352-54 (cited in note 2) (describing
extremely low conviction rates-below 10%--for Michigan's widely publicized mandatory
sentencing law for possession of a firearm); Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 332 (cited in note 5)
(noting low conviction rates, or jurors' refusal to convict, under harsh and well-publicized
mandatory-sentencing rules for drug offenses in New York, firearms offenses in Massa-
chusetts, and "three strikes" in California).
110 Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 370-71 (cited in note 101).
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The other two responses to the nullification concern relate to
two necessary premises underlying it. The first premise is an
empirical one: that juries armed with information about punish-
ment levels in fact would nullify more than they currently do.
The second premise is a normative supposition: that such an in-
crease in nullification would be a bad thing, either because nulli-
fication is inherently bad, or because the presently proposed re-
form would lead to nullification in a particularly troublesome
subset of specific cases.
Both of those premises are questionable."' As to the first, it
is hardly clear whether juries in possession of punishment
knowledge would be (1) consistently more lenient than now, 112 (2)
consistently harsher than now,"' (3) sometimes more lenient and
sometimes harsher, or (4) generally about the same as they are
now. 114
In fact, some critics of this Article's proposal might express
the opposite of the nullification concern, fearing instead that ju-
ries will use their knowledge of punishment ranges not to reject
convictions, but rather to impose convictions for offenses whose
111 Compare Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury Nulliffcation": When May and
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am Crim L Rev 239, 245 (1993) ("Given
the procedural safeguards and requirements of group decisionmaking, we can remain
confident that, first, instances of nullification will continue to be rare, and second, if
twelve individuals decide to 'nullify,' they will have a good reason for so doing.").
112 See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U Chi L Rev 433, 438-42 (1998) (claiming that juries some-
times nullify offenses subject to "three-strikes" and other harsh sentencing rules);
Marder, 93 Nw U L Rev at 895-97 (cited in note 30) (offering evidence that juries nullify
three-strikes rules); Loretta J. Stalans and Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and
Change in Law Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing, 14 L & Human Behav 199, 206
(1990) (finding that lay citizens might prefer sentences below minimum statutory sen-
tence for some offenses). Compare Shari Seidman Diamond and Loretta J. Stalans, The
Myth ofJudicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 Behav Sci & L 73, 74-81 (1989) (claiming that
jurors empowered to make sentencing decisions are as lenient or more lenient than
judges); Brent L. Smith and Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the Judge-Jury
Sentencing Debate: An Analysis of Robbery Sentences in Six Southern States, 9 Crim
Just Rev 1, 4 (1984) (finding that Alabama judges were harsher than sentencing juries).
113 Compare Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study
of El Paso County, Texas, 45 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 3, 9-10 (1994) (summarizing
a study's findings that "jury sentences are both more harsh and more dispersed than
judge sentences ... [and] that the differences between the length of average sentences
imposed by the two authorities, which seem to run in the direction of greater severity by
juries, increase with the seriousness of the offense"); id at 31-37 (providing findings of
study); King and Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 946-49 (cited in note 4) (finding that sentenc-
ing juries are harsher than judges).
114 Compare Michelle D. St. Amand and Edward Zamble, Impact of Information About
Sentencing Decisions on Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System, 25 L &
Human Behav 515, 526 (2001) (finding juries' sentencing tendencies to be similar to
judges').
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corresponding penalties are overly harsh. (In some ways, the un-
derlying concern is the same-that juries will ignore the law-
but the fear is that juries might express their lawlessness by ex-
panding or enhancing crimes rather than, or as well as, by nulli-
fying them.) Juries may be thought to lack experience and thus
to view relatively minor offenses as serious crimes, whereas more
seasoned judges might see minor offenses for what they are.
That specific concern-the possibility of "upward nullifica-
tion"-strikes me as related less to the jury's function than to the
judge's. The jury should be instructed only as to charges with
sufficient factual support that a decision to convict must be con-
sidered reasonable." 5 In other words, true upward nullification-
a decision to reject the law despite clear evidence to the con-
trary-never should be possible (or, at any rate, never would be
provable) if the judge adequately has enforced the prosecution's
burden of production for all charges sent to the jury. True, the
jury may choose, based on punishment-related considerations, to
convict of the most serious offense among those plausibly sup-
ported by the evidence. The possibility, however, exists in any
jury trial; the only way to minimize that risk is to narrow the set
of options that the jury receives in the first place.
As to the general issue of jury harshness or leniency, the
evidence from jury-sentencing states is interesting, though not
conclusive. A study by Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble tends to
support the view that where juries are empowered to impose sen-
tences-a system distinct from that proposed in this Article-
juries tend, on the whole, to impose harsher sentences than
judges." 6 It is not clear, though, whether this behavior by juries
is entirely due to their lack of experience. While some maintain
that inexperience leads to harsher jury sentences," 7 others main-
tain the opposite: that juries who hear multiple cases become
1'5 See Jackson v Virgnia, 443 US 307, 324 (1979) (holding that a conviction must be
reversed if no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
116 See King and Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 907-08 (cited in note 4) (finding that Ken-
tucky juries impose much higher sentences); id at 923-24 (finding jury sentences longer
than bench sentences for most offenses in Virginia, with the most notable exception being
rape, for which sentences were roughly equivalent); id at 939 (finding, in Arkansas, sig-
nificantly higher jury sentences than bench sentences for drug offenses, but no significant
differential for other offenses).
117 See, for example, id at 900 (quoting a Kentucky defense attorney as saying, "Eve-
rybody's afraid that jury sentences are higher than what a judge would do-jurors ha-
ven't seen one of these guys before, don't know his is a fairly typical crime."); King and
Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 914 (cited in note 4) ("Interviewees also reported that jurors do
not have the experience in sentencing that judges have and, as a result, may overreact to
what a judge would consider a routine, less serious offense.").
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harsher over time.11 8 King and Noble point out that "[tihese com-
peting hypotheses pose interesting empirical questions for fur-
ther study."" 9 They also cite some statistical evidence by way of
a master's thesis that examined jury sentences in Kentucky and
concluded: "More experienced juries punished criminal defen-
dants more severely, on average[,] than did less experienced ju-
ries." "' Other studies suggest that juries can be quite harsh, in
terms of both deciding whether to convict and deciding how much
punishment to give, when responsible for meting out punish-
ments themselves, but tend to be more lenient when their au-
thority is limited to providing a recommendation to some other
body. 12' Though further investigation is warranted, the finding
suggests that this Article's proposal would be less problematic
than a system of jury sentencing in terms of its potential to gen-
erate overly harsh punishment.
There certainly is reason to believe that juries would, at
least sometimes, make different decisions if they had more in-
formation. 122 In some cases, they might switch from a conviction
vote to an acquittal vote.'23 In others, though, the switch might
118 See, for example, id at 914 n 95 (quoting a Virginia judge: "I'd have jurors in the
past that would sit for sixty days or more, and their sentences would get tougher and
tougher as they had more trials .... They see more cases and they think there's a crime
wave. Especially that last day of the term. That's when they think, this is our last oppor-
tunity to put a stop to this nonsense. I always say if you've got a good personal injury
case, try it on the last day of the term, the jurors tend to be their most punitive."). But see
id at 932 (quoting an Arkansas judge as saying, "Juries, especially inexperienced jurors,
are more lenient.").
"9 Id at 932.
120 King and Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 932 n 151 (cited in note 4).
121 Consider Martin F. Kaplan and Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control
of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 L & Psych Rev 1, 8 (1986) (noting that observed
outcomes varied only when the appearance of guilt was low; in such cases, "conviction
votes were lowest when an authority controlled a severe punishment" and "were most
numerous, and were as likely as when evidence was highly incriminating, when [the
mock jurors themselves] controlled either mild or severe punishment") (emphasis in
original); id at 13 (noting that mock jurors who controlled punishment "assigned more
stringent punishments than did [those] who recommended punishments to an authority").
122 See King and Noble, 57 Vand L Rev at 912-13 (cited in note 4) ("It is doubtful that
Virginia juries invariably agree with the stiff minimum sentences they are required to
return. For example, after convicting a man of giving a 17-year-old a puff of marijuana,
and learning that the minimum sentence for that crime was ten years in prison, one jury
reportedly refused to return a sentence that high. The judge declared a mistrial and se-
lected a new jury for sentencing."); id at 947 ("[Dlefenders in Kentucky and Arkansas also
reported that jury sentencing can work to the defendant's advantage if the jurors learn
during the guilt phase of the prospect of a stiff minimum sentence and decide to acquit as
a result. In other words, the juror's knowledge of the sentence may give defendants a
chance at jury nullification in some cases.").
123 See, for example, Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 347 (cited in note 101) ("The
defendant, who had been charged with possessing a rock of cocaine, told the jurors when
they returned a guilty verdict: 'I want you all to know you put me away for 25 to life!'
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be toward punishment and away from acquittal. Knowing the
relatively low typical sentence ranges for, say, negligent homi-
cide or involuntary manslaughter might encourage juries to re-
turn convictions in cases where they might now assume that the
penalty is too harsh.124 Studies to date indicate, though not uni-
formly, 2 5 that juror decisionmaking is affected by knowledge of
the prospective punishment.'26 Perhaps not surprisingly, jurors
appear most concerned about severe prospective penalties when
the evidence supporting the prosecution's case is relatively
weak. 2 ' On the whole, though, the data can hardly be said to
offer any clear general conclusion.
12
These considerations lead into the response to the second,
normative, premise, which may be stated as a question: is any of
that necessarily bad? After all, jury nullification, if it were to oc-
cur, almost certainly would not take place across the board, but
only as to certain offenses and, perhaps, certain situations.
Surely the offenses and situations conducive to nullification
would be those where the legislature most likely got it wrong in
determining the offense grade-wrong in terms of tracking the
When the judge polled the jury to confirm its verdict, two jurors, including the foreperson,
changed their votes. The trial ended in a hung jury."), quoting Harriet Chang, Some Ju-
rors Revolt Over 3 Strikes/Penalty Prospects Sway Their Verdicts, SF Chron Al (Sep 24,
1996).
124 See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 308 (cited in note 54) ("A series of
negligent automobile homicide cases presents a situation in which the jury is disposed to
guess at the penalty. In these cases the jury is uncertain what the penalty will be but
fears that, since death is involved, it will be serious. The judge's view is that the momen-
tum to acquit is generated primarily by an impression of the penalty, and that if the jury
had known what the actual penalty would be, it would be less disturbed.").
125 See Jonathan L. Freedman, et al, Severity of Penalty, Seriousness of the Charge,
and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 18 L & Human Behav 189, 200 (1994) (concluding that ver-
dicts do not vary as a function of crime or penalty severity).
126 See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr and Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between
Precision and Flexibility in Explaining "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt," 6 Psych Pub Pol &
L 769, 780 (2000) (reviewing literature regarding effects of jury knowledge of punishment
and concluding that as a whole, it supports the "notion that juror decision making is
influenced by crime and penalty severity").
127 See Kaplan and Krupa, 10 Law & Psych Rev at 14-16 (cited in note 121) ("Con-
trary to expectation, severity of penalty did not have a substantial positive effect on of-
fender evaluations. Severe penalties did not reduce subjects' certainty of guilt, and led to
fewer convictions when evidence was mildly incriminating [i.e., weak] and an authority
[i.e., rather than the jurors themselves] controlled a real punishment [i.e., one not
thought to be simulated]. .. . These findings suggest that knowledge of a severe penalty
may reduce convictions in weaker cases."). Compare Lillquist, Expected Utility Theory at
10-13 (cited in note 67) (arguing that knowledge of severe penalty may lead jurors to
adjust degree of proof needed to satisfy reasonable-doubt standard).
128 Compare Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 354 (cited in note 101) ("Anecdotal
evidence is all that is available to show that juries [in New York] have balked at return-
ing convictions in some drug cases, knowing that the sentences meted out [under the
'Rockefeller drug laws'] will be harsh.").
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shared moral judgment of the community. If the jury is uncon-
vinced in a given case that a prescribed level of punishment is
appropriate, then its decision probably reflects one of two senti-
ments: (1) the legislative grading of the offense, though generally
valid, swept too broadly and cannot justly be applied to the cir-
cumstances of the specific case; or (2) the chosen grading is alto-
gether inappropriate and too high. The jury should be entitled to
voice either sentiment-to deny the jury these options is merely
to exploit its ignorance for the sake of obtaining a conviction that
the jury would not approve.
Importantly, the current system facilitates imposition of
sentences, based on the jury's conviction vote, to which the jurors
themselves might respond with outrage, not to mention guilt or
regret, over their unwitting complicity in the outcome.'29 This
prospect should not be downplayed or neglected. One important
virtue of a jury system is its power to promote the legitimacy of
our legal institutions, both through the jury and to the jury. Jury
service promotes feelings of civic engagement and reinforces
one's support of the legal system. But where the result of a jury
process differs radically from what the jurors themselves wanted
or expected, we can expect them only to lose confidence in those
institutions.13
It also might be possible to erect a system that enables ju-
rors to send a signal about their punishment preferences without
having to engage in nullification.' 3 ' A revised and more refined
129 Jenia Iontcheva relates an example:
[One] Florida case involved a jury who found that a thirteen-year-old boy who was
'practicing wrestling moves" on another child-who subsequently died-had in-
tended to harm the child. This resulted in a verdict of first-degree murder. Unbe-
knownst to the jury this meant an automatic sentence of life without parole. Jury
members were described as "horrified" to learn the effect of their verdict[.]
Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 314 n 15 (cited in note 5), citing Dana Canedy, As Florida Boy
Serves Life Term, Even Prosecutors Wonder Why, NY Times Al (Jan 5, 2003) (citation
omitted).
130 See Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 345 (cited in note 101) ("One juror who had
served on a jury that had convicted a woman for taking a five-dollar cut in a cocaine deal
'felt deceived by the court' after learning that the defendant would go to prison for life
under [California's] three-strikes law."), quoting Rene Lynch and Anna Cekola, "3
Strikes"Law Causes Juror Unease in O.C., LA Times (Feb 20, 1995).
131 Compare Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 340 (cited in note 101) ("Admittedly,
the jury verdict is a blunt instrument for communicating disagreement [with a law or
sentencing rule]. In a criminal case, the jury can only communicate with a verdict of
guilty, not-guilty, or a hung jury; moreover, a criminal jury does not decide a sentence
except in some capital cases. When juries wish to express their disagreement with a po-
tential sentence about which they have not been told but often surmise, their only means
is an acquittal or hung jury.").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
verdict system 3 2 might enable the jury to return a qualified con-
viction of, say, "guilty but deserving clemency"-that is, to find
that the elements of the offense have been proved while declining
to authorize the stated penalty, or at least recommending a pen-
alty at the bottom of the available range. A jury also might be
given the option of returning a verdict along the lines of "not
punishable, but equally condemnable"-finding that the ele-
ments of the offense have not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, though the proven facts suggest the defendant is just as
blameworthy (in terms of the suitable punishment range) as if
they had been. Here again, the jury would send a useful signal
about the appropriate punishment-especially in cases where it
combines such a "reluctant acquittal" with a conviction of a
lesser-included offense, suggesting that a punishment on the
high end of that offense's range is warranted.
In these ways, the jury could express the view that the facts
of a particular case do not track the level of blame or punishment
reflected in the available liability range. Without requiring the
extreme step of nullification, these signaling mechanisms might
offer a more direct and actionable rebuke to the legislature than
current nullifications, which occur sub rosa, are hard to identify,
and do not provide a clear message.
Another possible concern with the proposal of this Article,
distinct from the nullification concern, relates to the risk of com-
promise verdicts. 33 The worry is that some jurors who otherwise
would hold out for acquittal, thus creating a hung jury, might be
persuaded to meet other jurors somewhere in the middle, leading
to punishment for someone who otherwise would receive none.
The unstated empirical premise for this concern is that compro-
mise verdicts somehow would be less accurate or more harmful
than the results we see in the current system, and I am aware of
no clear evidence supporting that claim. It well may be that ju-
ries compromise on lesser-included offenses at present, and do so
with no clear idea of whether they are meeting in the middle or
nearer the high or low end of the spectrum of punishments avail-
able.
132 For further discussion of the potential for a more sophisticated verdict system to
enable juries to send clearer signals regarding their findings or regarding offenders'
blameworthiness, see Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, Law Without Justice: Why
Criminal Law Doesn't Give People What They Deserve Ch 9 (Oxford forthcoming).
133 See Sauer, 95 Colum L Rev at 1242-43 (cited in note 12) (discussing the fear of
compromise verdicts as a central concern driving the refusal to inform the jury of the
sentencing consequences of conviction). See also id at 1262-63 (rejecting this argument in
the context of informing juries about mandatory sentences).
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Further, the nature and extent of any such compromise
would depend on the ranges that attach to the different possible
offenses. If one offense has a punishment range of six to thirty
years of imprisonment, and a lesser offense has an available
range of four to fifteen years,134 then there is a lot of overlap. If
different grades have sufficient room on both the low and the
high end, the jury will not be certain that its compromise would
dictate any specific amount of punishment. The jury will know
only what it should know: that it is determining the broad rela-
tive seriousness of the defendant's offense, using knowledge
about the legislative assessment of varying categories of offense
seriousness. This scenario seems considerably different from the
risk of compromise verdicts in a system where the jury fixes the
sentence, as occurs routinely for felonies in six states (apparently
without any rampant complaints about improper compromise
verdicts). 135
The somewhat speculative possibility of increased rates of
compromise verdicts is hardly more troubling than the current
system of outright ignorance and determination of punishment
in the two-step fashion outlined above: (1) an automatic linking
of the jury's decision with a punishment range, followed by (2)
broad sentencing authority vested in one judge. If jurors can
reach consensus as to an appropriate range of punishment, even
through compromise, that seems at least superior to the current
prospect of "compromises" whose substance is unknown and
which therefore might be unsatisfying to all parties.
Indeed, one might wonder whether or why "compromise" is
somehow inherently undesirable:
As for juror harshness and compromise verdicts, it is not
clear to me why the critics assume these are bad things,
or indeed how they can complain about both when an in-
crease in one (compromise verdicts) presumably reduces
the other (juror harshness) .... The compromise verdict
criticism is an interesting one. First, of course, the word
"compromise" is rife with ambiguity. . . . [O]ne juror's
134 See 730 ILCS Ann 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000) (authorizing a term of six to thirty
years for a Class X felony); id at 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (authorizing a term of four to fifteen years
for a Class 1 felony, one level below Class X).
135 The six states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.
See Lillquist, 82 NC L Rev at 646-47 n 111 (cited in note 4) (collecting authority). Case
law in Kentucky, however, has interpreted that state's system to involve only nonbinding
jury recommendations as to sentence. See Murphy v Commonwealth, 50 SW3d 173, 178
(Ky 2001) (finding that the jury's decision as to sentence is not a mandate).
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principled holdout is another juror's irrational nullifica-
tion. One jury's "compromise" is another jury's perfectly
appropriate give-and-take deliberations.... [Why isn't a]
"compromised" criminal verdict-in which, for example, a
jury could find that the defendant was guilty, but only so
guilty that he or she should spend two years in prison in-
stead of twenty-far preferable from every perspective
than a hung jury, where neither the state nor the defen-
dant achieves any resolution? 13
6
The compromise "concern," then, cuts both ways.
II. THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN PUNISHMENT
Although the jury has a role to play-the central role, this
Article argues-in assigning blame, the conviction decision
represents only a subset of the moral choices involved in impos-
ing punishment. Numerous other moral judgments are currently
made at sentencing, by the judge.
A. Normative "Factfinding" at Sentencing
The judge, like the jury, has a mixed role under current
rules: he or she effectively decides facts, assigns blame, and
makes legal determinations. As with the offense elements given
to the jury, the sentencing factors decided by the court often de-
mand moral judgments as well as factual findings.'37 Blakely
provides an example: in Washington, one aggravating sentencing
factor is a finding that a domestic violence offense involved "de-
liberate cruelty."138 The Federal Guidelines allow a similar up-
ward departure where "the defendant's conduct was unusually
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim."139 Some guide-
lines ask the judge to determine if the crime's victim was particu-
larly "vulnerable."4 ' Further, the Federal Guidelines allow
downward departures for "significantly reduced mental capac-
136 Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 990-91 (cited in note 5).
137 See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 106 (2004)
("Factors pertinent to sentencing are often complex and involve legal, factual and value
judgments all at once.").
138 See Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (West 2004). See also Kan Stat Ann
§ 21-4716 (2003) (enhancement for "excessive brutality").
139 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5K2.8 (2004)
("USSG").
140 See USSG § 3A1.1(b). See also id § 8C2.8(a)(5); Kan Stat Ann § 21-4716 (2003);
Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A-535 (West 2004).
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ity" 41 or where the offense was "aberrant behavior"14 2 by an oth-
erwise law-abiding person-both rules that essentially invite the
court to rule on the defendant's moral compass or character.
The judge's overlapping duties may sometimes interfere with
each other. Institutional concerns, for example, may intrude on
the capacity to make case-specific judgments, as judges bear
some risk of institutional bias. In routine cases, the judge, who
has ties to other repeat players in the criminal justice system
and who has a large docket, may simply defer to the factual find-
ings of the prosecutor or probation officer.'43 Federal judges, for
example, commonly accept the factual findings appearing in a
probation officer's pre-sentence report, unless the defendant ex-
plicitly challenges a finding.' In other words, the judge may not
act truly as an independent factfinder, but instead rely on the
conclusions of other parties.
Some specific guidelines determinations also typically are
given to, rather than found by, the judge. To take one example,
although in theory the Federal Guidelines reduction for "accep-
tance of responsibility" a5 should track some individualized as-
sessment that the defendant has shown some remorse or contri-
tion as to the crime, that departure for various reasons currently
amounts to nothing other than a judicial rubber stamp on plea
bargains, automatically reducing the punishment whenever an
offender pleads guilty. 146 Downward departures for providing
"substantial assistance" to the government are similar.' a
141 USSG § 5K2.13.
142 USSG § 5K2.20.
143 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 72 (cited in note 2) ("[B]ecause the judge is a re-
peat player, she might be more inclined to favor the government's view of the facts as the
government is also a repeat player in the criminal justice process.").
144 See FRCrP 32(i)(3)(A) (allowing the court to "accept any undisputed portion of the
presentence report as a finding of fact"); Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Brzght Line: A
Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw U L Rev 1635, 1673-76 (2003) (describ-
ing the probation officer as "the 'keeper' of the sentencing system and the guardian of the
guidelines" and explaining rules governing the preparation and adoption of the sentenc-
ing guidelines report). See also United States v Smiley, 997 F2d 475, 483 (8th Cir 1993)
(Bright dissenting) (noting that "the sentencing judge often summarily approves the
sentencing recommendations of the probation officer"); United States v Harrington, 947
F2d 956, 966 (DC Cir 1991) (Edwards concurring) (observing that "many trial judges
appear to accept the Report as written"). Compare FRE 1101(d)(3), Advisory Committee
Notes (stating that in sentencing, "great reliance is placed on the presentence investiga-
tion and report").
145 See USSG § 3E1.1.
146 See, for example, United States v Escobar-Mejia, 915 F2d 1152, 1153 (7th Cir
1990) (describing "acceptance of responsibility" departure as "a thinly disguised reduction
for pleading guilty"); Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Re-
sponsibility: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal
128 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2005:
B. Punishment Judgments at Sentencing: "Judge Nullification"
When the judge knows of the existence of a draconian sen-
tencing rule or mandatory minimum, he or she may find a way to
avoid implementing that harsh sentence by finding facts--or im-
posing an offsetting downward departure, where possible-in a
way that avoids undesirable results. Andrew Leipold has com-
piled data strongly suggesting that exactly this phenomenon has
developed at the federal level. 4 ' The rise of guidelines sentencing
and mandatory minimum sentences under federal law has coin-
cided with an increasing disparity between the relatively high
acquittal rates of judges (who know about the existence of the
high guidelines sentences or minimums) and the lower acquittal
rates of juries (who do not).'49 In other words, it is entirely possi-
ble-Leipold does not explicitly make this assertion, though he
hints at it-that guidelines and mandatory minimums have cre-
ated a system that enables, and perhaps fosters, "judge nullifica-
tion" in the form of acquittals that go against the law for the
sake of preventing harsh punishment.
The bench-trial judge, then, may take seriously the role of
assigning blame, but do so in a way that conflicts with governing
law and introduces the potential for inconsistency. In this and
other ways, guidelines and mandatory minimums do not remove
inconsistency or discretion, but shift it so that the judge appears
to be exercising discretion in her capacity as factfinder, rather
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw U L Rev 1507, 1534 (1997) (noting that in many federal
districts, judges automatically award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to all defen-
dants who plead guilty).
147 USSG § 5K1.1. See generally Cynthia Yy. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge:
Reigning [sic] in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance
Departures, 50 Rutgers L Rev 199 (1997) (discussing relationship between judges and
prosecutors with respect to substantial-assistance departures); see id at 234-35 ("[T]he
prosecutor not only controls whether or not a departure can be granted, but also ... the
extent of the departure.... [P]rosecutors play a defining role in determining whether a
defendant receives a downward departure based on substantial assistance. It goes with-
out saying that the authority to veto a substantial assistance departure is a significant
power in light of the fact that such departures constitute the bulk of all departures and
an increasing percentage of all Guidelines sentences.").
148 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone, 83 Wash U L Q
151 (2005).
149 Id at 152 ("Between 1989 and 2002, the average conviction rate for federal criminal
defendants was 84% in jury trials, but a mere 55% in bench trials. Just as importantly,
this 'conviction gap' increased dramatically over this period-while the jury conviction
rate increased slightly in recent years, the judicial conviction rate has fallen dramati-
cally."); id at 164-67 (providing tables detailing this trend); id at 200-18 (discussing the
hypothesis that the rise of sentencing guidelines, and judges' knowledge of rules under
guidelines, has driven this trend).
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than in her unstated but nonetheless real capacity as assigner of
punishment by means of conviction.
Juries, of course, have no knowledge of first-stage punish-
ment consequences. Accordingly, the potential for judge nullifica-
tion, with no corresponding possibility in a jury case, creates a
discrepancy between the prospects of a bench-trial defendant and
those of a jury-trial defendant. In addition to creating an arbi-
trary distinction leading to inconsistent treatment, this discrep-
ancy establishes a perverse incentive for defendants-at least,
for those few defendants who know about the imbalance of in-
formation and its ramifications-to waive a jury trial in favor of
a bench trial.
The dichotomy between judges' and juries' discretion in this
area is all the more unusual because the criminal jury, rather
than the judge, is the institution generally empowered to exer-
cise the kind of unreviewable normative power that the potential
for "judge nullification" suggests. Juries are not expected to offer
reasons for their decisions to convict or acquit, and conviction
votes are reviewed only for the most fundamental kinds of error,
whereas acquittal votes are entirely shielded from review.
Judges, on the other hand, are expected to offer some formal ex-
planation for their decisions, and those decisions are typically
subject to review and later revision or rejection by other judges
or by legislative action. 5 °
C. Judge v Jury
The judge is not better positioned than the jury to make
moral judgments.' 5 ' The judge's relative competence vis-a-vis the
jury has two aspects: expertise and professionalism. The judge
knows the law and also may know more about how the justice
system works. Indeed, the initial rise of trained lawyers and
judges was a major factor in the erosion of juries' authority to
decide legal issues as well as factual issues. 152 The judge also is a
150 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 60-61 (cited in note 2).
151 Compare Paul H. Robinson and Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions:
Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 Colum L Rev 1124, 1146 (2005)
("If shared community intuitions of justice are a central determinant of liability, the jury
will have a substantial advantage because it can more reliably articulate those intuitions
than an individual judge.... [Giroups [also] tend to be better at decisions involving
judgment or evaluation because groups are better at taking multiple factors into ac-
count."); id at 1148 ("Jurors really do have an advantage in making the normative judg-
ments that the public so closely associates with doing justice.").
152 See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 917 (cited in note 16) (noting one pos-
sible explanation for "displacement of jurors by judges in resolving legal issues" is that
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repeat player and can get a better sense than the jury of how
cases relate to each other.153 Judges potentially are better able
both to get a sense of overall sentencing trends, and to maintain
consistency over time across their own sentencing decisions.' 54
Both of these competencies are relevant, but they should not
outweigh the jury's independent say in assigning moral blame in
at least some basic fashion. 55 The jury should have an initial role
and responsibility with respect to decisions about appropriate
levels of punishment. The judge then should retain the power to
make the second punishment decision-sentencing-as that de-
cision then may capture more precisely a sense of the propor-
tionate punishment that one offender merits relative to another.
This also may enable the judge to employ his or her expertise as
to what amount or method of punishment might better serve the
system's utilitarian goals in individual cases-determinations
that may require some technical knowledge and familiarity with
what works. 56
"[Wurors initially resolved legal issues at a time when lawbooks and legal professionals
were in short supply," and were moved aside as legal professionalism progressed);
Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 324 (cited in note 5) ("As the nineteenth century progressed,
courts began restricting the authority first of the civil jury, and then of the criminal jury.
... The gulf between the roles of juries and judges grew as the rise of law schools created
a new class of specially trained legal experts.").
153 See Wright, 108 Yale L J at 1378 (cited in note 55) ("The best reasons to favor
sentencing judges over sentencing juries, however, do not involve the power of the judge
to individualize a sentence. Instead, judges gain an advantage over juries because they
are better able to coordinate a sentence in one case with sentences in other cases....
Because judges sentence regularly, they might find ways to become more consistent with
other judges and to impose better sentences tomorrow than they did yesterday.").
154 See id ("We might expect coordination among different sentencers at any given
time, giving us some assurance that similar offenders and offenses will receive similar
sentences. We might also expect sentencers to coordinate their work over time: Sen-
tencers could learn from experience, notice developing problems or trends, and improve
their sentences over time.").
As to the second benefit-consistency within a single judge's own pattern of sen-
tences-see also Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 987 (cited in note 5) ("[E]ven if there is the
same variability amongst all judges as there is amongst all juries, there no doubt will be
some measure of uniformity, and therefore predictability, in how any particular judge
sentences particular kinds of crimes.").
155 Compare Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 Georgetown L J 387,
432-34 (2002) (arguing that the distinction between "offense elements" and "sentencing
factors" should be based on whether the issue involves a question of moral fault, in which
case it should be an offense element for the jury to decide).
156 As discussed earlier, reliance on (or faith in) the technical expertise of the judge-
and other players, such as parole boards-with respect to implementing utilitarian objec-
tives, such as rehabilitation and incapacitation, helped drive the shift in punishment-
related authority away from juries and toward those other players in the middle of the
last century. See Part I-B-2. Although those objectives now share the stage with retribu-
tive purposes, and likely will continue to do so, they remain relevant to sentencing as
tools for selecting a specific punishment from within a prescribed range or for determin-
ing the method (rather than amount) of punishment.
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In fact, a system where both judge and jury effectively (and
explicitly, unlike the current system) share authority over an
offender's ultimate punishment might best maximize the
strengths of each while undercutting their weaknesses.'57 For
example, as repeat players, judges have expertise that juries lack
and may be better able than juries to craft specific sanctions
within a prescribed range,' including alternative sanctions to
incarceration.'59 At the same time, some maintain that judges'
Some more recent work also suggests that, though the utilitarian project foundered
in the 1960s and 1970s because of methodological shortcomings, new advances might
increase the potential for experts to make useful judgments about whether at least some
categories of criminals are amenable to rehabilitation or represent a future danger. For
example, as to assessing dangerousness for purposes of incapacitation, see John Monahan
et al, Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Violence and Disorder (Ox-
ford 2001); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw U L Rev 1, 9
("Due to a number of methodological difficulties in measuring prediction validity, we may
never know precisely how accurate the various modes of prediction are. But we can say
that prediction science-in particular, methods that utilize actuarial tables or structured
interviews-has improved to the point where clear and convincing evidence of danger-
ousness, if not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is available for certain categories of indi-
viduals."); id at 9 n 32 (listing empirical studies).
As trained professionals and repeat players, judges would be better suited than
juries to assimilate and implement these findings. See Robinson and Spellman, 105
Colum L Rev at 1146 (cited in note 151) ([I]f the dominant purpose [of the punishment
system] is the incapacitation of dangerous offenders-for which the central criteri[on] is
not the offender's blameworthiness but a clinical assessment of his dangerousness-or if
the dominant purpose is the general deterrence of potential offenders-for which the
central criteria [are] again factors other than blameworthiness-then judges may be
better able [than juries] to elicit and understand those expert opinions upon which the
judgment will be based.").
157 Compare Robinson and Spellman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1146-50 (cited in note 151)
(discussing relative strengths of juries and judges, as well as other possible players such
as sentencing commissions, with respect to different sentencing decisions involved in
individual cases; tentatively concluding juries should make normative judgments,
whereas judges should implement utilitarian goals and determine the specific amount
and method of punishment).
158 As more experienced parties, judges may be less likely than juries to fall victim to
cognitive biases such as "anchoring" or "scaling" problems that lead to erratic or arbitrary
choices when a decisionmaker has no clear basis for selecting any particular point along a
spectrum of options. See, for example, J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal
Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, Mich Law and Econ Res Paper No
05-004, 21-25 (discussing likely anchoring and scaling problems for sentencing jurors).
This Article's proposal is less likely to create such problems for juries than, say,
jury sentencing would, because the jury is not being asked to select a particular penalty,
but simply being informed about the penalties related to the options already on the jury's
menu of choices. Juries may suffer from cognitive biases in choosing from that menu as
well, but any such biases exist even without the present proposal. See, for example, id at
25 ("Mock juries presented with the option of convicting on a lesser-included offense quite
frequently take that option, generating a 'compromise effect.'"); Lillquist, 82 NC L Rev at
654-71 (cited in note 4) (discussing possible "compromise" and "decoy" effects from pre-
senting additional options to the jury). Implementation of the proposal should not aggra-
vate those current biases dramatically-though further empirical study would be wel-
come on this score.
159 See Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 1005-06 (cited in note 5) ("[A] judge, through sheer
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familiarity with criminal cases "overconditions" them so that
they become insensitive to the subtleties of individual cases.16 As
one trial judge has written:
At the very least, an argument can be made that trial
judges' intense day-to-day experiences with a part of life
about which most jurors have no knowledge actually
makes judges worse sentencers rather than better ones:
our very experience deadens us to the seriousness of
crimes and the requirements of just desert. Ordinary citi-
zens with little or no exposure to criminal excess may be
the best people to gauge that excess.16 '
Jury participation in the first stage of the process of imposing
punishment might temper this potential problem.
Juries, on the other hand, may lack the sophistication or ex-
pertise to make refined judgments about the precise amount-or,
as is also significant, the method' 6 2-- of punishment, but should
experience, is undoubtedly in a better position than most jurors to craft appropriate (and
available) probation conditions. The same is true of the various cousins to probation-
deferred judgments, community corrections, and other innumerable state varieties of
sentences short of prison.").
160 See Taylor, 419 US at 530 (claiming that juries protect against the "perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge"); Duncan, 391 US at 156 (stating that jury
trials provide "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"); Sparf, 156 US at 174 (Gray dis-
senting) ("[I]t is a matter of common observation, that judges and lawyers, even the most
upright, able, and learned, are sometimes too much influenced by technical rules; and
that those judges who are wholly or chiefly occupied in the administration of criminal
justice are apt, not only to grow severe in their sentences, but to decide questions of law
too unfavorably to the accused."); Marder, 93 Nw U L Rev at 918 (cited in note 30) ("[T]he
jury is a check on professionals, who may have grown too removed from the experiences
and common sense reasoning of ordinary citizens. Relatedly, jurors are nonrepeat players.
They hear only one case, which means they bring to their interpretation of the law a
freshness that a judge who has heard many cases may no longer have."); Weninger, 45
Wash U J Urban & Contemp L at 19-20 (cited in note 113) (reporting that judges some-
times acknowledge becoming jaded from seeing many criminal cases). See also Iontcheva,
89 Va L Rev at 353 (cited in note 5) (noting concern with "overconditioning").
161 Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 990-91 (cited in note 5).
162 Consider id at 1005-06 (acknowledging, while advocating jury sentencing author-
ity, that judges should probably retain authority over decision to impose probation rather
than a prison sentence); Robinson and Spellman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1149-50, 1157
(cited in note 151) (suggesting judges should make decisions regarding method of pun-
ishment).
Importantly, although retributive concerns speak to the proper amount of punish-
ment, they have nothing to say about the proper method (or methods) of imposing that
punishment. Accordingly, there is no reason not to have judges, with their superior
knowledge of what is likely to work, craft specific sanctions designed to achieve utilitar-
ian goals, once the jury has provided general guidance as to the appropriate amount of
punishment. See Robinson and Cahill, Law Without Justice at Ch 9 (cited in note 132)
(discussing the potential for the system to use the punishment method to achieve utilitar-
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at least have some broad authority to pass on the appropriate-
ness of placing an offender into a general punishment category.
Among other things, the jury represents a broad cross-section of
society, whereas the judiciary may not.'63 Jurors also have no
personal or professional stake in trial outcomes, as other institu-
tional players might.' Partly for these reasons, and perhaps for
others as well, 6 ' giving the jury an explicit and shared role with
the judge might enhance the system's legitimacy among the gen-
eral public, as "Is]tudies of the public perception of the fairness of
judges and juries . . . reveal that citizens overwhelmingly rate
jurors as fairer decisionmakers in criminal trials."'66 The jury
ian goals, while setting the punishment amount according to desert-based considera-
tions).
163 See Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 72 (cited in note 2) (observing that it is "more
likely that juries will represent the community's perception of the facts than 'trial judges
[who] collectively do not represent-by race, sex, or economic or social class-the commu-
nities from which they come'") (quoting Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U Pa L
Rev 1, 63 (1980)); Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 363-64 (cited in note 101). See also
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich L Rev 63, 100 and n 139 (1993) (stating that
judges are "primarily white, male, middle-class").
To be sure, the jury's connection to the community carries its own risks of bias and
abuse, see Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 74-77 (cited in note 2), but the size and possible
diversity of the jury, relative to a single judge, might help reduce the likelihood of bias.
See Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 50 (1986) ("The jury's heteroge-
neous makeup may also lessen the power of prejudice."); Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just
at 365 (cited in note 101) ("Ideally, the differences among jurors enable them to challenge
each other's assumptions and to correct each other's mistakes."). Further, any govern-
mental agent has the potential to abuse its discretion or exercise bias, and "[t]he jury's
enshrinement in the Constitution and the powers it has retained in criminal cases for 200
years reflect[] the judgment that any risk of disparity from jury involvement in the crimi-
nal justice process is outweighed by the benefits the jury brings." Barkow, 152 U Pa L
Rev at 77 (cited in note 2).
164 See Marder, 93 Nw U L Rev at 918 (cited in note 30) ("[Jurors] are likely to be
viewed as fair arbiters not only because they have no personal stake in the outcome, but
also because they shed their official role of juror as soon as they render a verdict.");
Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 363 (cited in note 101) ("Nor are jurors likely to con-
sider how a particular outcome might enhance their reputation or increase their power,
as a professional might.").
165 For example, the very fact that juries need not explain their decisions, and that
those decisions will not serve as precedent in future cases, enables the juries to exercise
great flexibility in deciding individual cases without creating a clear record over time that
suggests inconsistency or lawlessness. See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the
Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 at 29
(Harvard 1975) (asserting that jury system offers "flexibility while simultaneously giving
the illusion of stability-two values that are important in doing justice in individual cases
and in convincing litigants that justice has been done them") (emphasis added).
166 Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 353 (cited in note 5). See also Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev
at 83-84 (cited in note 2) ("Whether because of its valuable function or its historical pedi-
gree, the jury to this day commands the respect and admiration of the American people.");
Robinson and Spellman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1145-46, 1148 (discussing significance of
public perception of juries as superior to judges). For a discussion of the significance of
"legitimacy" to the criminal-justice system, see Robinson and Cahill, Law Without Justice
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also arguably better upholds the proper institutional (and consti-
tutional) balance of power. 6 '
Nancy Marder has summarized the considerations in favor
of ensuring a decision-making role for both the judge and the
jury:
All of the institutional features that the jury brings to the
process-that jurors are ordinary citizens drawn from a
cross section of the population, that they engage in a
process of group deliberation, and that they are nonpro-
fessionals who hear only one case-are critical features
that the trial judge cannot offer. The trial judge has many
other institutional advantages that he or she brings to the
interpretive task, such as professional training, a perspec-
tive developed from hearing many cases over time, the
vehicle of the judicial opinion in which to express his or
her reasoning, and resources such as prior cases to con-
sult for guidance, but these are not substitutes for the in-
stitutional features of a jury.168
There is no obvious reason why these general observations, indi-
cating that a shared role for judge and jury is best, are any less
true with respect to the particular question of determining pun-
ishment.
This Article's proposal is generally in accord with the nu-
merous contemporary proposals suggesting that the best system
of criminal punishment employs a "limiting retributivism" ap-
proach, where retributivist concerns define a general range of
available punishments for an offender, within which a specific
punishment is chosen based on utilitarian criteria. 169 For exam-
at Ch 7 (cited in note 132).
167 Consider Hoffman, 52 Duke L J at 994 (cited in note 5) ("[T]he Founders decided
that certain kinds of civil cases and all criminal cases are too important to leave to
judges. It is not that the Founders believed jurors are more competent than judges, it is
that they believed jurors are more trustworthy than judges.").
168 Marder, 93 Nw U L Rev at 920 (cited in note 30).
169 See, for example, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for
Revision (2002), reprinted in 6 Buff Crim L Rev 525, 556 (2002) ("ALI Sentencing Plan")
(explaining that "[r]etribution can ... operate as an important limitation upon utilitarian
goals"). Norval Morris often is cited as an early exponent of such an approach. Consider
Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 78 (Chicago 1974) ("Retribution ... not only
limits the worst suffering we can inflict on the criminal, but also sometimes dictates the
minimum sanction a community will tolerate."); Norval Morris, Madness and the Crimi-
nal Law 196 (Chicago 1982) (arguing to "treat desert as a limiting rather than a defining
principle of punishment"); Norval Morris and Michel Tonry, Between Prison and Proba-
tion: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 84-93 (Oxford 1990)
(discussing generally retributive punishment philosophies). For other early discussions of
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ple, the ALI's Sentencing Project, currently rewriting the sen-
tencing rules of the Model Penal Code, has embraced such an
approach. 7 ' Typically, however, these recent proposals suggest
that both the retributivist and utilitarian features of such a sys-
tem would operate at the sentencing stage, with sentencing
guidelines setting a broad, retributivist sentencing range reflect-
ing an offender's general level of blameworthiness, from which
the judge then would select a particular level (and, perhaps,
kind) of punishment, perhaps with regard to utilitarian goals."7
I propose a different system, where offense grading rules
rather than sentencing rules would perform the initial retributiv-
ist demarcation of a punishment range, and where the jury
would implement that first punishment decision while explicitly
recognizing that it was doing so. Once the jury has chosen the
offense, whose corresponding grade defines a broad punishment
range, the judge can use her expertise to assign a punishment
within that range, perhaps paying particular attention to utili-
tarian goals and facts related to them, such as prior record, dan-
gerousness, or the most effective (or least restrictive) method of
punishment. The judge's technical expertise-derived from ex-
perience as well as legal knowledge-may help rein in any jury
excesses or insufficiencies with respect to proportionality. The
judge also may employ a more specialized understanding as to
the empirics of effective sentencing, in terms of both the amount
and method of punishment.
This proposal is also largely in keeping with, though it does
not precisely replicate, proposals to make the offense-element
versus sentencing-factor distinction (which is critical under the
Apprendi line of cases) reflect the distinction between "offense-
related" and "offender-related" facts. 72 Offense-related facts are
the concept of retribution as a limiting principle on punishment, see H.L.A. Hart, Pun-
ishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 235-37 (Oxford 1968) (de-
scribing the combination of retribution and utilitarian theory); Herbert L. Packer, The
Limits of the Criminal Sanction 140 (Stanford 1968) (discussing how retribution can
dictate the amount of punishment for particular offenses, "with perhaps some mitigation
allowed for less than normal wickedness on the part of particular offenders").
170 See ALI Sentencing Plan, 6 Buff Crim L Rev at 555-57 (cited in note 169); id at
621-22 (suggesting revision of MPC § 1.02 along limiting-retributivism lines).
171 See id at 557 (proposing development of limiting-retributivism scheme via revision
of sentencing rules).
172 See Douglas Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U Chi Legal F 1. Com-
pare Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S Cal L Rev 289,
355-56 (1992) (arguing that "many of the decisions being made at sentencing proceedings
under the guidelines do not belong in those proceedings at all").
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generally relevant to establishing the moral gravity of the of-
fense in a retributivist sense. At the same time, retributivists-
at least, act-based retributivists-focus only on the deed and the
actor's moral accountability for it, and not on broader offender-
related traits that relate to a more general sense of the actor's
moral character. A utilitarian, on the other hand, would rely on
offender-related facts to guide determinations regarding the
prospects of achieving special deterrence or rehabilitation of this
particular offender, or the need for incapacitation based on an
individualized finding of dangerousness.
III. REFORMING THE SYSTEM
This Part sketches some of the practical nuts-and-bolts is-
sues that would arise in trying to implement the Article's pro-
posal and explores the proposal's ramifications for the various
players in the criminal-justice system and for other legal issues.
Although certain details might need to be hammered out over
time, a commitment to affirm the jury's fault-finding role with
respect to punishment could realign the roles of judge, jury,
prosecutors, and the legislature to better accord with their rela-
tive competencies.
A. Implementation
1. Methods.
One initial question as to the practicality of this Article's
proposal relates to how, or by whom, it would be implemented.
As noted earlier, I do not consider this proposal to be a constitu-
tional mandate.'73 It could be effectuated by statute-but given
all I have said to criticize how legislatures operate and to point
out that this proposal is designed to strengthen juries at the ex-
pense of legislatures,7 4 one might wonder why any legislature
would be interested in enacting such a scheme.
It is also possible, however, for the judiciary to implement
this proposal, either through promulgation of general rules of
court or by a decision in individual cases to admit evidence of
punishment ranges or include information about those ranges in
jury instructions. For example, Judge Gerard Lynch recently
considered giving a criminal jury an instruction regarding the
173 See note 12 and accompanying text.
174 See Part I-C-1.
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ten-year mandatory minimum sentence corresponding to a de-
fendant's charged drug offense.' 5 Though the Second Circuit or-
dered Judge Lynch not to do so,'76 it is by no means clear that
trial judges are (or must be) generally barred from offering such
information in jury instructions.
2. Details.
Even if this Article's thesis strikes the reader as sensible,
there certainly remain numerous tricky details to hammer out.
For example, should juries receive additional information about
how to decide an appropriate punishment range--or how the law
will operate, such as through guidelines, to narrow the statutory
range-beyond simply being told the broadest possible range of
punishments for an offense? Perhaps the defense, or the prosecu-
tion, would want to inform the jury as to what factors, including
guidelines factors, will lead to the sentence falling in one part of
the range rather than another. Sometimes the defense might
want to inform the jury that available guidelines would require
(perhaps based on an offender's criminal history, though the de-
fense would not want to explain that basis) a higher punishment
than the technical statutory minimum. The defense thereby
might assuage possible jury concerns that the defendant could
receive an inappropriately low sentence at the bottom of the au-
thorized range.
In some cases, on the other hand, the prosecution might
want to reassure the jurors in the other direction by stating that
the statutory maximum punishment exaggerates the penalty
that the defendant is likely to receive under governing sentenc-
ing rules. In such a situation, however, the prosecution's state-
ment should properly be held to waive the right to argue at sen-
tencing for any punishment higher than the prosecution said
would be authorized.
Further, perhaps the defense would want to introduce evi-
dence of other crimes falling in the same grade as a charged of-
fense. Imposing liability for a particular grade of felony in a drug
or firearm case, for example, might seem less proper if a jury
knows that other more serious-seeming offenses, such as rape or
175 See United States v Pabon-Cruz, 255 F Supp 2d 200, 214 (S D NY 2003) (noting
that such an instruction would alert jurors to the "moral consequences of their deci-
sions").
176 See id (stating that the Court of Appeals issued a writ of mandamus to forbid the
instruction, "concluding that to do so would encourage forbidden jury nullification").
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attempted murder, are crimes of the same grade (or lower).177
Armed with such information, the jury might decide that an of-
fender's particular crime is better treated as a lesser-included
offense whose grade better captures its relative seriousness.
Whether providing such information is proper-and if so, how
much information to give-remain open questions, perhaps best
left to resolution over time, as judges and other participants gain
experience and insights about how best to inform the jury as to
punishment consequences.
3. An analogous case: The insanity defense.
A good illustration of the oddities of the current system, and
the role that this Article's proposal envisions for the jury, is the
jury's unawareness of the consequences of finding the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI")."7 ' The typical conse-
quence of a verdict of NGRI is not that the defendant is free to
go, but that he is remanded for psychological evaluation and pos-
sible civil commitment.'79 The system accordingly manages any
danger that an insane person presents independently of whether
that person is convicted. In theory, then, the jury's actual func-
tion in choosing between a guilty verdict and NGRI is purely to
assess the defendant's moral blameworthiness, rather than to
address any utilitarian concern about incapacitating on the basis
of dangerousness. Indeed, the underlying basis for having an in-
sanity defense at all arguably relates purely to limitation of un-
warranted moral blame rather than any utilitarian goal. 80
177 Compare, for example, 720 ILCS Ann 570/401(a)(1)(A) (manufacturing, delivering,
or possessing with intent to deliver 15-100 grams of heroin; Class X felony), with id 5/16-
16.1(a)(2), (c)(2) (possession of 6-10 stolen firearms within 2-year period; Class X felony),
and with id 5/8-4(c)(1) (attempted murder in the first degree; Class X felony), and with id
5/12-14(a)(1)-(3), (d)(1) (forcible sexual intercourse involving a dangerous weapon, injury
to victim, or threat to victim's life; Class X felony).
178 See Wayne R. LaFave, Crzminal Law § 8.3(d) at 432 (4th ed 2003) ("One might
think, simply as a matter of logic, that if the insanity issue is in the case the jury would
be told of its significance, that is, of the fact that commitment must or may follow a find-
ing of not guilty by reason of insanity .... The better view is [that] ... it does not make
sense that a jury should be presented with three verdict choices (guilty, not guilty, and
not guilty by reason of insanity) but know the consequences of only the first two.") (foot-
notes omitted).
179 See, for example, id at § 8.4 at 434 ("In a minority of states and also in the federal
courts, statutes require automatic, mandatory commitment of a defendant who has been
found not guilty by reason of insanity .... In all other jurisdictions, commitment is possi-
ble but not mandatory."); id at n 5 ("[I]n practice, however, commitment usually follows.").
180 See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson
Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 Va L Rev 1839, 1842-45
(2000) (discussing the difficulty of constructing an instrumentalist justification for insan-
THE JuRYAS FA ULT-FINDER
In practice, however, current rules regarding jury instruc-
tions undermine, rather than facilitate, any effort to divorce con-
cerns about the defendant's potential dangerousness from the
jury's evaluation of his guilt. Many jurisdictions adopt a rule
against informing the jury that, should it vote for an NGRI ver-
dict, the acquitted will not be free but will be remanded for psy-
chological evaluation and treatment.' The United States Su-
preme Court has explicitly condoned this rule.8 2 The bases for
the rule are similar to those for the current refusal to instruct
juries about any other punishment-related issues: it's not the
jury's business; it might lead to compromise verdicts; it will only
confuse the jury. 183
Yet those reasons are exactly backward. The idea behind the
do-not-inform rule is that instructing the jury about conse-
quences will lead the jury to focus too much on consequences,
ignoring the legal issue of guilt or innocence. But, of course, re-
fusing to instruct jurors about consequences does not mean that
they stop caring about them'8-it means only that jurors are
more likely to act on their concerns in an ignorant and counter-
productive manner, such as by voting for conviction out of fear
that conviction is the only way to ensure that a dangerously ill
offender will obtain needed help. If a jury were reassured that
treatment for mental illness would not depend. on a conviction,
then it truly would be able to rule on guilt and guilt alone.
The same reasoning holds true for knowledge of punishment
consequences. Refusing to tell the jury about the consequences
does not make the issue go away, either legally (the jury's deci-
sion does have ramifications for the available punishment) or
practically (the jury's thought process still likely will include
ity or other excuse defenses).
i1 See LaFave § 8.3(d) at 432 and nn 62-63 (cited in note 178); Thomas M. Fleming,
Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital
Confinement in Event ofAcquittal, 81 ALR4th 659, 666-71 (1990).
182 Shannon v United States, 512 US 573, 587-88 (1994).
183 See id at 579 ("[Plroviding jurors sentencing information invites them to ponder
matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their fact-finding respon-
sibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.").
184 See, for example, Henry Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental
Condition Under the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 Temp L Q 235, 247
(1956) ("Preliminary statistics [from a University of Chicago Law School study] show that
[the result of the NGRI verdict] is indeed one of the most important factors in the jury
deliberations. 'If we acquit him on the ground of insanity,' the jury wants to know, 'will he
be set at liberty to repeat his act?' Not a single jury studied in the jury project refrained
from considering what would happen to the defendant as a precondition for arriving at a
decision concerning his guilt or innocence, sanity or insanity.").
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considerations of possible punishment 85 ). If juries are concerned
about outcomes, they will make decisions on that basis; if they
are not told about possible outcomes, the only result will be that
their outcome-oriented decisions are uninformed and arbitrary.
The jury's decision does affect the outcome as a legal matter-so
why should the jury not be aware of this, especially since every
other participant in the system does know the effect of the con-
viction vote on punishment options?
B. Consequences for Other Institutional Players
The anticipated roles of judge and jury under this Article's
proposal have been discussed, in Part II-C. Yet the proposal also
will affect various other participants in the criminal-justice sys-
tem. Here I discuss its potential impact on the authority and
proper function of two such players: prosecutors and legislatures.
1. Prosecutors.
I have spoken little so far about prosecutors, who play a cen-
tral role in the current system. Here I will address two possible
objections--one principled, the other practical-regarding the
impact of this Article's proposal on prosecutorial power or prac-
tice.
The principled objection is that the proposal improperly un-
dermines the prosecutorial role in the system. I have asserted
that no decisionmaker currently applies broad legislative pun-
ishment decisions in specific cases, yet some might argue that
part of the prosecutor's role is to do exactly that. 18 6 Prosecutors
185 I have found surprisingly little direct empirical analysis regarding the extent to
which criminal juries generally do consider potential punishments (actual or perceived) in
their deliberations regarding whether to convict, notwithstanding the typical instruction
that they are not to do so. Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel's landmark study suggests
that punishment considerations are significant when punishment is known, or thought to
be known. See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 307 (cited in note 54) (stating
that although juries are not informed of possible penalties, and are told not to consider
penalties, "[n]evertheless, the threatened penalty may come to dominate the deliberation,
because the jury guesses at the magnitude of the legal penalty, or because it has special
reason to know what the penalty actually is"). And as noted above, other studies have
explored whether giving jurors more information about punishment changes their deci-
sions, see notes 112-14, and there is some anecdotal evidence that this is so, see, for
example, note 108, 122-23.
There seems to be little systematic data, however, regarding the frequency with
which current juries make decisions based on potential punishments, despite their lack of
information and despite being charged not to. If there have been any detailed studies of
this issue (and there certainly should be, whatever one thinks of this Article's thesis), I
have not come across them.
1ss I am indebted to Erik Lillquist for pointing out this possible objection.
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make charging decisions based in part on their sense of the ap-
propriate punishment range for a given offender. My proposal,
some might argue, thus derogates prosecutors' current role in
making normative judgments.
I question that claim, both descriptively and normatively.
First, I doubt whether prosecutors' charging decisions are gener-
ally, or uniformly, driven by the prosecutors' own sense of a
proper punishment. It is very likely that prosecutors do not sim-
ply try to maximize defendants' sentences, but the issue of what
prosecutors are maximizing is more complex 87 and is probably
guided at least as much by practical considerations and con-
straints as by moral judgments or objectives.'88
In any event, prosecutors certainly seem more susceptible to
conflicted interests and priorities than juries when it comes to
imposing punishment on offenders. And that is in the best case;
it is also possible that prosecutorial choices about what charges
to bring and what bargains to strike will reflect bias (even if the
prosecutors themselves are not consciously biased), generating
disparate results. 9 Prosecutorial decisions (like jury decisions)
are also discretionary and effectively unreviewable, so there is no
greater likelihood of outside scrutiny that might identify and
curb abuse. Absent clear evidence that prosecutors are actually
good agents in making these decisions, there is no obvious reason
to entrust them to prosecutors instead of juries.
Perhaps prosecutors have more expertise than juries, but
the same is true of judges, who also would seem less conflicted
than prosecutors. To the extent that one seeks a more sophisti-
cated decisionmaker than the jury as to broad punishment cate-
gories, one might do better to advocate a judicial rather than a
prosecutorial role, perhaps by reinvigorating Eighth Amendment
187 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow,
117 Harv L Rev 2548, 2554 n 6 (2004) ("There is as yet no developed social science litera-
ture on what prosecutors maximize, probably because the solution is too complex to model
effectively."), citing, as among the best of the efforts in this area, Edward L. Glaeser, et
al, What do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2
Am L & Econ Rev 259, 266-88 (2000); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States:
StipulatingAway ProsecutorialAccountability, 83 Va L Rev 939, 956-69 (1997).
188 See Stuntz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2554 (cited in note 187) ("Voter's preferences,
courthouse customs, the prosecutor's reputation as a tough or lenient bargainer, her own
views about what is a proper sentence for the crime in question-all these things play a
role in defining the sentences that prosecutors are likely to seek in plea bargains.").
189 See, for example, McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 286-87 (1987) (discussing the
"Baldus study"'s assessment of the risks of both juror bias and prosecutorial bias);
Barkow, 152 U Pa L Rev at 75-77 and nn 191-92 (cited in note 2) ("Studies on race and
capital sentencing have found even greater disparities in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion than in jury discretion.").
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scrutiny. Giving judges such a role might well be a good idea, but
as I have discussed, there is good reason for juries, and not only
judges, to exercise authority in this area.19 °
Further, even if prosecutors currently are making charging
decisions based on their own sense of suitable judgment, I'm not
sure that that is their proper role. Why should a prosecutor, as
an agent of the government charged with enforcing the law, not
seek the highest punishment that the facts support?19' Of course,
if the prosecutor goes even beyond that, one might be troubled;
but the possibility of prosecutorial overreaching seems again to
suggest a call for enhanced judicial authority, this time in the
form of enforcing the state's burden of production and dismissing
unsupported charges.
The practical objection to this Article is that the proposal, if
implemented, would change prosecutors' real-world behavior for
the worse. Fearing lenient juries, prosecutors might start to add
charges more serious than those they currently pursue, in an
effort to ensure appropriate punishment. As the foregoing dis-
cussion indicates, however, I am not convinced that prosecutors
currently pursue less than the most serious possible offense
standing a chance of generating a conviction, nor am I entirely
convinced that they should.
2. Legislature.
This Article's proposal also has consequences with respect to
the proper function of the legislature in defining and structuring
criminal-law rules. One possible result of implementing the pro-
posal might be that offenses would be more narrowly defined
than at present, with more distinct grades. (Narrower ranges of
punishment might reduce the likelihood that a jury, hearing the
full available range, would think the floor too low or the ceiling
too high, or both.) The jury then could find all relevant offense
facts as elements, while still allowing room for the judge to exer-
cise discretion when sentencing within the range provided for the
offense.
190 See Part II-C.
191 Of course, this claim merely restates the 'nullification" concern, but directs that
concern at prosecutors rather than juries. If a jury's group decision to "nullify" is trou-
bling, why should a single person's decision to reject a legislative mandate be any less
troubling merely because it goes by the name of "prosecutorial discretion"? If anything,
the prosecutor, as advocate, should be more assertive in pursuing all available charges
and it should fall to other players, such as judges and juries, to restrain them from over-
reaching.
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Consider, for example, the current allocation of punishment
distinctions as between offense grades and sentencing rules in
the federal system. The federal criminal code does not provide for
offense grades at all: it defines offenses merely with a maximum
and (sometimes) a minimum sentence, often with a wide range of
possibilities between the two.'92 The definitions of the offenses
themselves are correspondingly broad.193 The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, on the other hand, recognize forty-three separate
"offense levels" for purposes of determining a sentencing range.' 94
Surely this scheme could be adjusted so that more refinement of
punishment is involved at the offense-definition level, so that
less of the work must be done at the sentencing stage. The job of
allocating between elements and sentencing factors ultimately
falls to the legislature.
C. Relation to ApprendiIssues
Apprendi and Blakely held that the jury must find certain
facts, but offered no guarantee that the jury would have any role
in assigning blame. The rule set out in Apprendi squarely ad-
dresses the jury's role as weigher of evidence pursuant to fact-
finding rather than the jury's normative function: "Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
192 See, for example, 18 USC § 81 (2000 & Supp 2001) ("Whoever, within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, willfully and maliciously sets
fire to or burns any building, structure or vessel, any machinery or building materials or
supplies, military or naval stores, munitions of war, or any structural aids or appliances
for navigation or shipping, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be imprisoned
for not more than 25 years[.]"); 18 USC § 2241(a) (2000) ("Whoever, in the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly
causes another person to engage in a sexual act-(1) by using force against that other
person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be
subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.").
193 See, for example, offenses cited in note 192; 18 USC § 111 (2002 & Supp 2002)
(defining assault offense for whoever "forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimi-
dates, or interferes with" a federal officer or employee; providing for punishment of up to
8 years, or up to 20 years if offender "uses a deadly or dangerous weapon"); 18 USC §
113(a)(2),(3) (2000) (punishing "assault with intent to commit any felony" and "assault
with a dangerous weapon"-offenses not defined in any further detail-by up to 10 years'
imprisonment); 18 USC § 371 (2000) ("If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.").
194 See USSG § 5A.
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submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 '
Blakely also, instead of fully discussing the basic principles un-
derlying the right to jury trial, focuses on two particular eviden-
tiary and procedural aspects of that right: first, the right to have
the prosecution's factual allegations proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a unanimously affirming jury; and second, a require-
ment that the prosecutor's charge must include all facts relevant
to the defendant's possible punishment (a rule rooted in a con-
cern about cabining prosecutorial authority, as opposed to affirm-
ing jury authority).196 In short-as an observation, not a criti-
cism, as this Article makes no claim about how to read the Con-
stitution-the Apprendi-Blakely rule seeks to draw formal lines
establishing minimum requirements, not to tackle more substan-
tive or aspirational issues involving jury competence or author-
ity. Booker makes this clear by effectively re-establishing the
authority of judges rather than juries to make sentencing deci-
sions, so long as any liability ranges provided by sentencing
guidelines are merely advisory and not mandatory.'97
The Apprendi-Blakely rule seems, and ostensibly is, pro-
defendant,19 but may not have that effect in the real world. De-
fendants who pursue jury sentencing "trials"-if such ever occur,
given Bookes eleventh-hour resuscitation of judicial sentencing
under guidelines-may obtain worse outcomes than before if the
jury does not possess the same information as a sentencing judge
with respect to how sentencing factors ultimately affect sen-
tences. Jury factfinding without jury knowledge of sentencing
consequences would deny the jury the "sentence nullification"
power that judges now hold, which might make the Apprendi-
Blakely reform harmful for defendants.
195 Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
196 See Blakeiy, 124 S Ct at 2536 ("[The Apprendl] rule reflects two longstanding
tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence: that the 'truth of every accusation' against
a defendant 'should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbours,' and that 'an accusation which lacks any particular fact which the
law makes essential to the punishment is ... no accusation within the requirements of
the common law, and it is no accusation in reason[.]") (internal citations omitted).
197 See Booker, 125 S Ct at 756-57 (remedying constitutional violation by modifying
United States Sentencing Guidelines to make them advisory, not mandatory). Compare
Robinson and Spellman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1156-58 (cited in note 151) (asserting that
Blakely articulates a rule recognizing proper prudential roles of jury and judge, but that
Booker retreated from this sound framework by eliminating a role for the jury in sentenc-
ing, thereby "undermining the legitimacy of the Court's justification for creating the con-
stitutional rule").
198 See id at 2541-42 (responding to concerns that the Court's holding is unfair to
criminal defendants; noting, among other things, that the Court's position was advocated
by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
144 [2005:
THE JURYAS FA ULT-FINDER
On the other hand, if the jury did know about the conse-
quences of conviction, then Apprendi-style formal procedural
concerns with ensuring that the jury has authorized the maxi-
mum available punishment would seem less critical, and possibly
superfluous. Solving the constitutional puzzle is not my project
here, but if jury convictions explicitly were grounded in knowl-
edge of the possible ensuing range of punishment, then the con-
siderations that sustain the Apprendi line of cases sentencing
rules would vanish-particularly as those rules relate to sentenc-
ing guidelines, which create a system for selecting a sentence
within the limits established by the offense grade.
If the jury is aware of those limits (and particularly the up-
per limit), and if its conviction vote thus reflects an overt ratifi-
cation of the full available range of punishment, then even if the
jury does not know how the specific sentence within the statu-
tory range will be determined-and even if the jury does not de-
cide the specific facts that determine the sentence-it seems dif-
ficult to say that the jury has not "authorized the maximum pun-
ishment." In my view, such a system actually provides for jury
"authorization" in a more meaningful way than a scheme that
lets the jury decide facts affecting punishment, yet allows-and
arguably encourages-the jury to remain ignorant of the mean-
ing of those facts in terms of punishment. 99 And such a system
surely involves the jury in punishment decisions more than the
return to judicial sentencing Booker seems to invite.
In this respect, the present proposal in some ways incorpo-
rates and transcends the concerns that gave rise to Apprendi and
its progeny. To the extent that the jury's imprimatur on an of-
fense's grade, with knowledge of the concomitant punishment
range, satisfies concerns about the need for the jury to ratify the
maximum possible punishment, Apprendi and Blakely command
too much by suggesting a requirement that the jury decide addi-
tional facts that determine a specific sentence within the grade
range.
At the same time, Booker demands too little by apparently
returning all sentencing-related punishment authority to the
judge while also maintaining the jury's blindness as to its convic-
tion-related punishment authority. Perhaps, then, the scope of
these cases is too narrow, not too broad. Perhaps the right to jury
199 Compare Iontcheva, 89 Va L Rev at 314 (cited in note 5) (asking, apropos of the
Apprendi line of cases, "why should juries be allowed to determine facts directly bearing
on sentencing, but be kept in the dark about the actual consequences of their findings?").
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trial should be a right to have the jury explicitly decide what the
maximum punishment will be, not just to decide the facts that
determine what the maximum punishment will be, which is all
that the Apprendi line requires. In this context, it is worth not-
ing that under present rules, in large measure, the parade of
horribles mentioned by some members of the Court-a fear, for
example, that the legislature will define a minor crime with a
wide range of sentencing possibilities 200-already has come to
pass. Legislatures have run amok in imposing high potential
maximum sentences and high mandatory minimum sentences.
With respect to both, the jury has no idea that its decision to
convict will lead to the harsh punishment that often ensues. Why
should one's right to a jury trial stop short of being a right to
have the jury act as an affirmative normative evaluator of the
propriety of a given maximum punishment, rather than just a
procedural or evidentiary decisionmaker whose findings have the
corollary effect of cabining that punishment? This Article pro-
poses that the jury's role, in keeping with the principles guiding
the Apprendi line of cases, should include being a normative
evaluator whose "authorization" of the maximum punishment is
knowing, not accidental.
D. Starting a Conversation
A large part of the problem of allocating responsibility be-
tween the first and second punishment decisions-conviction and
sentencing-is that offense definitions are too broad and crude,
leaving sentencing rules to shoulder too much of the burden.
Many of the relevant factors that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines now address should appear more appropriately within the
offense definitions of the criminal code itself. 1 Making the ini-
tial punishment decision explicit, rather than covert, might en-
courage more and better decisionmaking about how the two dis-
tinct punishment decisions should relate to each other. It might
promote more legislative deliberation about how much we should
200 See Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2558 (Breyer dissenting) ("Congress and state legislatures
might, for example, rewrite their criminal codes, attaching astronomically high sentences
to each crime, followed by long lists of mitigating facts, which, for the most part, would
consist of the absence of aggravating facts."); Apprend, 530 US at 541-42 (O'Connor
dissenting) (discussing the possibility of legislatures responding to the Court's rule by
enacting criminal statutes with broad sentencing ranges and allowing the demonstration
of absence of certain facts to mitigate a sentence).
201 See notes 192-94 and accompanying text (discussing the current allocation of rules
as between the federal criminal code and sentencing guidelines).
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limit the defined punishment range for an offense grade imposed
at conviction, thereby circumscribing judicial sentencing author-
ity without eliminating it. Then the second decision about sen-
tencing would serve to refine the grading judgment even further
and more precisely, but would not be a selection from among a
wide array of possible punishment levels.
One of the potentially most useful aspects of the present
proposal is that it begins a dialogue about punishment that in-
volves all the relevant institutional players: legislatures, sen-
tencing commissions, judges, and juries."2 Each retains a role,
and each incorporates and can respond to the messages that it
receives from the others. As experience offers us information
about how juries use the information that we give them, we can
rearrange the allocations of punishment decisions between grad-
ing and sentencing rules, making each broader or narrower when
and to the extent that doing so seems desirable.
CONCLUSION
Recent United States Supreme Court case law has reinvigo-
rated analysis of the role and function of the criminal jury. This
renewed attention to the jury's role is a positive and significant
development, but its potential will be unnecessarily confined
unless it enables inquiry beyond a narrow focus on the constitu-
tional right to jury trial. Numerous subconstitutional or extra-
constitutional issues regarding the proper scope of jury authority
also merit consideration.
This Article has discussed one such issue. Our system cur-
rently gives juries explicit power to resolve contested moral is-
sues in individual cases-such power is, in fact, a central aspect
of the jury's institutional purpose. Our system also gives the
jury's conviction vote practical significance as an initial stage in
the process of determining an offender's punishment. Yet the
system erects an artificial barrier between fact-finding and pun-
ishment decisions, making the jury's conviction vote, in terms of
its punishment-limiting consequences, a decision without an in-
formed-and thus arguably without a true-decisionmaker. This
202 See Marder, 6 J Gender Race & Just at 369 (cited in note 100) ("The jury... per-
forms a limited, but quite critical, role. It allows ordinary citizens to express disagree-
ment with the law, its enforcement, or its sentencing scheme, and it makes this feedback
available to the other branches of government. The other branches can then respond to
avert crisis.").
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Article has argued that we should tear down this wall and pro-
vide juries with information about the punishment ramifications
of their conviction votes.
While the present proposal empowers the jury, it need not
undermine the role or authority of the legislature or judge. In-
stead, a more transparent and informed jury decision-making
process holds the hope of facilitating a conversation among all
these institutions, checking each one's weaknesses or excesses
while playing to each one's strengths.
